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Abstract 
Since the well publicized scandals of Enron and WorldCom, research on the phenomenon of 
organizational corruption has focused on understanding and explaining the dynamic processes 
inherent in this complex problem. In this regard, socialization processes have been identified 
through which an individual is induced to first engage in corrupt behavior. One such way of 
socialization is when a first corrupt act is explicitly ordered by an authority figure. Once an 
initial corrupt act has been performed, a dynamic, incremental process between corrupt acts 
and rationalization has been postulated by several researchers, such as Lowell (2011) in his 
model of self-justification. In this process of escalation, the initial act subsequently increases 
in severity and ease. On an individual level, the present study attempts to experimentally find 
and examine this escalating process between rationalization and negative acts, which are 
ordered by an authority figure. Therefore, 88 participants were tested in a role play where they 
were asked to function as an “accountant” and administer a defined amount of money to 
another person that had to solve several mental arithmetic tasks. However, contrary to the 
originally established instructions, which clearly stated that the money had to be paid out for 
correct answers only, the experimenter suddenly ordered the participant to pay out the money, 
even though a wrong answer was given. Together with dissonance theorists (Aronson, 1968; 
Thibodeau and Aronson, 1992), it is argued that this creates a conflict, which arouses 
dissonance by leading the individual to perform an act that contradicts his sense of being a 
competent and consistently acting individual, and that therefore is inconsistent with the self-
concept. In order to reduce this dissonance, rationalization of the act can render it acceptable. 
However, this increased acceptance leads to lower amounts of protest against a second, more 
severe demand of the act, and subsequently to its internalization- the performance of the act, 
even when the authority is absent. In general, results revealed that 14 % disobeyed the order, 
43 % obeyed the order, but expressed a constant amount of protest and refused to internalize 
it, and 43 % of participants internalized the act. For participants who internalized, an 
escalation of behavior was found: while severity incrementally increased, their resistance 
against the act simultaneously decreased throughout the experiment. Moreover, in two 
different conditions, the amount of money increased either linearly or exponentially in order 
to examine the effect of severity of the act. Results indicated that, for these participants, 
rationalization was indeed the psychological ‘engine’ of this escalation, as higher severity of 
the act paradoxically led to lower amounts of protest, which can be explained by stronger 
rationalization, adapting to the act’s severity. Accordingly, participants who internalized the 
demand also revealed a more positive affectivity than other participants, by stating a higher 
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satisfaction after the experiment, which indicates a more successful reduction of dissonance. 
Finally, while the average amount of protest was moderately associated with the personal 
tendency to behave submissively towards authority figures, there was no association with any 
personality trait of the Big-Five. Hence, the present study confirms the theoretical 
assumptions regarding the escalating effect of dissonance reduction through rationalization, 
and it shows that this escalation can be triggered by obedient behavior towards an authority 
figure.  
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1. Introduction 
The phenomenon of organizational corruption is both, ancient and ongoing, and has a 
tremendous importance in modern society. For example, “the World Bank has singled out 
corruption as the largest obstacle in economic and social development” (Aguilera and 
Vadera, 2007, p. 432). Accordingly, the U.S department of justice emphasized the negative 
impact of organizational corruption by stating that the economic costs, stemming from 
organizational crimes, are up to 25 times higher than those stemming from street crime 
(Aguilera and Vadera, 2007). In addition, besides the economic consequences, corporate 
misdeeds also severely damage society’s trust in its institutions and organizations (Ashfort 
and Anand, 2003).  
For instance, according to the newspaper “Der Standard”, corrupt practices in Austria, such as 
bribery and the gain of illegitimate advantages, increased throughout recent years, and are 
estimated to cost the state 27 billion Euros in 2012. Besides these direct economic costs, the 
increase in corruption also leads to lower investments, as honest companies are discouraged, 
and to a loss of specialized workers, who flee the unappealing working conditions (“Der 
Standard,” 2012). In 2009, a new Austrian anticorruption law became effective, as the 
previous law was criticized for being too vague and not accurate enough. The new law differs 
between crimes in the private and the public sector, whereas, in general, embezzlement, 
bribery, and the acceptance of gifts from private potentates or attendants are seen as offences 
in the private sector, and, on the other hand, violations of duties, such as bribability or the 
arrangements of bribery, interventions and acts against prohibitions, and the demand for 
illegitimate advantages are seen as delinquencies in the public sector, committed by officials. 
However, the new law still evokes criticism, as, for example, the definition of the term 
“officials” is somewhat problematic. For example, a member of parliament is only seen as 
“official”- and thus affected by the law’s regulations and policies- when he or she gives his or 
her vote in parliamentary polls. In the private sector, but also in the public sector, sentences 
for corruption vary from three month up to ten years of imprisonment, depending on the 
financial damage caused by it and the specific type of criminal practice. For example, while 
the maximum sentence for bribery is ten years, it is only five years for illegitimate gains of 
advantages (Schuschnigg, 2010).  
Accordingly, in 2010, Austria was criticized by the OECD due to the lack of rigorous 
anticorruption rules for government and semi-government organizations. The country was 
blamed for applying less rigorous policies from the private sector to such government 
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organizations, instead of the rules the OECD has demanded. Thus, corrupt practices were 
facilitated by lax anticorruption policies (“Der Standard”, 2010). A prominent example is the 
BUWOG case, a real estate firm with government links, which was reported in “Die Zeit”, a 
weekly German journal. During the privatization of 62.000 apartments in 2004, lobbyist Peter 
Hochegger and Walter Meischberger, who was a member of the federal council and a member 
of parliament, received commissions close to ten million Euros without providing any obvious 
effort whatsoever (Kraske, 2011). 
However, the problem of organizational corruption is not restricted to certain countries, 
instead, unethical practices within international organizations and corporations nowadays 
seem commonplace (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 2004). Two of the most prominent 
international cases of organizational corruption in recent time were the scandals of Enron and 
WorldCom. In 2001, Enron, a multinational energy corporation- and the seventh largest 
corporation in the US- collapsed due to massive forms of fraudulent activity. Enron developed 
a highly complex business model that incorporated numerous products and exceeded national 
borders, but that also “stretched the limits of accounting” (Healy and Krishna, 2003, p. 9). 
While being hyped as America’s most innovative company, its actual financial performances 
were problematic (Healy and Krishna, 2003). For example “Enron invested $ 1.2 billion in 
fiber-optic capacities and trading facilities, but the telecommunication broadband market 
collapsed. Furthermore, it could never generate adequate profits from energy trading in 
markets, such as metals, to cover the billion dollar mistakes” (Petrick and Scherer, 2003, 
p.38). By systematically withholding information about losses and providing false 
information about the company’s profits, the company managed to conceal its true financial 
performance and its problematic financial situation and thereby deceived its stakeholders and 
the public. Enron was still able to attract large sums of capital by concealing their actual 
performance and artificially inflating their assets, however, eventually the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) started to audit Enron as the company failed to provide 
sufficient evidence for the claimed earnings, which subsequently uncovered the accounting 
scandal. In general, both former CEO’s, Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling, were mainly responsible 
for the scandal (Brickey, 2003). However, while Jeffrey Skilling currently serves a 24-year 
sentence in a Federal Corrections Facility, Ken Lay died before he was sentenced (Bajaj and 
Eichenwald, 2006). 
However, the case of Enron was not an isolated incident. The scandal of Worldcom, the 
second largest telecommunication company in the US, was too a case of accounting fraud and 
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inflated income reports that led to losses of billions of dollars in shareholder values. As “a 
major provider of internet services, which include Internet backbone, hosting, virtual private 
networks, and wholesale Internet service provider services” (Sidak, 2003, p. 227), WorldCom 
falsely reported that internet traffic was doubling every one hundred days, in order to 
“exaggerate the value of its stocks” (p. 230). This reported growth rate naturally attracted 
investors and encouraged overinvestment (Sidak, 2003). At the same time, the company 
inflated its income by taking $400 million out of the accounting departments account and 
reported it as company’s earnings. Eventually, Cynthia Cooper, Vice President for Internal 
Auditing, “sought to expose and correct a massive accounting fraud” (Brickey, 2003, p. 
369). WorldCom’s CFO, Scott Sullivan and Buford Yates, the Director of General 
Accounting, both were charged with several accusations, including fraud and conspiracy. But 
also several subordinates were indicted, who later all stated that they were acting on order 
from superiors and senior management (Brickey, 2003).  
Hence, regarding organizational corruption, together with Voliotis (2011), it can be stated 
“that the phenomenon is systemic, large scale, enduring and important” (p. 537). Generally, 
there are countless manners of corrupt behavior, as organizational corruption can be referred 
to as any “deviant behavior that manifests itself in an abuse of a function […] on one’s own 
or the other’s initiative in order to achieve an advantage for oneself or a third party” (Rabl, 
2011, p. 85). Other definitions of organizational corruption are similarly loose. For example, 
Anand, Ashfort and Joshi (2004) defined corruption as a “misuse of an organizational 
position or authority for personal or organizational (or subunit) gains, where misuse in turn 
refers to departures from accepted societal norms” (p. 40). However, Karklins (2003) 
proposed a more specific typology of corruption based on its impact on the societal system. 
Based on this typology, Figure 1 illustrates the different types of corruption and their impact 
on the societal system. 
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Figure 1. Typology of different kinds of corruption, based on the impact on the societal 
system. (Karklins, 2003). 
On a first, less far-reaching level, typical corruption includes such acts as bribery, obfuscation 
and lying, illegitimate profiteering or gains of advantages, and extortion. On a second level, 
there are corrupt acts such as diverting public resources, mismanagement and profiteering 
from public resources, nepotism, clientelism, and profiteering from privatization. At the third 
and highest level, corruption severely impacts state and public. Such corrupt acts include 
misuse of legislative powers, takeover of public institutions for private business or criminal 
activity, corruption of the judicial process, and misuse of investigatory powers (Karklins, 
2003).  
Moreover, as these examples show, deception seems to be a crucial factor for corrupt 
activities, because it is either used to cover up other acts of corruption, such as environmental 
pollution and bribery, or, on the other hand, deception itself is the main corrupt act, for 
example by withholding true information- like performance troubles- or by providing false 
information- like blown up financial performances- to shareholders, as was the case in the 
Enron and the WorldCom scandals (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2008).  
Towards a dynamic approach to organizational corruption 
Despite the magnitude and severity of this phenomenon, until recently, theory and research 
that attempted to understand and explain the problem of organizational corruption primarily 
had been static, focusing mostly on single factors- for example, on individual or on 
organizational factors- but felt short of acknowledging and integrating the dynamics that 
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evolve between the different factors. Both, the Enron and the WorldCom case initiated 
research on organizational corruption within the field of business ethics, which sought to 
include different factors and, most importantly, the dynamic processes evolving between them 
(Nieuwenboer & Kaptein, 2007). 
Anand, Ashfort and Joshi (2004) postulated such a dynamic model based on their analysis of 
several cases of organizational corruption. Their analysis, which included the cases of Enron 
and WorldCom, revealed “disturbing features […] these and many other corruption cases” 
(p. 39) had in common. First, corrupt practices were not the actions of single, independently 
acting individuals, but instead were embedded in a broader organizational context, and 
therefore involved numerous employees and co-workers who were cooperating. Second, they 
found that it typically were upright citizens engaged in cases of corruption in organizations: 
„Most such acts were committed by individuals, who were upstanding members of the 
community, caring parents, and givers to charities- clearly different from the image of a 
typical criminal” (p. 38). Third, a notable aspect was that these individuals did not view 
themselves as corrupt or unethical and denied the notion of being criminals. Fourth, corrupt 
practices were not single occurrences, but continued and prevailed over long periods of time. 
Finally, a fifth feature was found, which showed that new employees, who usually hadn’t 
have been engaged in corruption before, adopted such practices when confronted with them in 
the new environment (Anand, Ashfort & Joshi, 2004). Most importantly, however, several 
researchers found an incremental process within cases of corruption, which led to an 
escalation of behavior, through which an initial corrupt act subsequently increased in its 
severity, ease and pervasiveness (e.g. Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2008; Anand, Ashfort and 
Joshi, 2004; Lowell, 2011). 
The escalation on an individual level 
In order to contribute to the explanation of these phenomena, Anand, Ashfort and Joshi 
(2004) postulated a dynamic model, as mentioned above. This model consists of two 
interacting and reinforcing general factors: rationalization and socialization. Individuals who 
engage in a corrupt act have a variety of tactics to rationalize their behavior, which means that 
they are “describing their actions in such a way that they do not appear to be unethical at 
all”, and thereby “neutralize their negative feelings or regrets about their behavior” (p. 40). 
This definition is widely shared, as for Tsang (2002), rationalization is a cognitive process, 
which aims at the reconciliation of behavior and the own crucial standards. Thus, 
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rationalization always serves the purpose to “render the behavior psychologically acceptable 
or give it a psychological value it did not have […]” (Beauvois, 2001, p.217). 
Rationalization can be achieved prospectively, for future actions, as well as retrospectively, 
for past actions. Either way, as we have seen, rationalization provides a way to perceive the 
behavior as justified, or at least as more justified. An example for such a rationalization is the 
general denial of responsibility for the action, or the denial that the act is injuring someone, as 
well as blaming the victim itself (Anand, Ashfort & Joshi, 2004). 
While rationalization aims at justifying an act, the second factor-socialization- refers to a 
more general process, in which rationalization is embedded, and that “involves imparting to 
newcomers the values, beliefs, norms, skills, […] they will need to fulfill their roles and 
function effectively within the group context” (Ashfort and Anand, 2003, p. 25). Thus, 
socialization describes the external forces through which an ethical individual can be initially 
induced to adopt corrupt behaviors. As Baucus (1994) suggested in this regard, “corporate 
culture may encourage illegality by creating conditions that predispose employees to commit 
wrongdoing. Shared values, norms and beliefs can influence an otherwise moral individual to 
engage in questionable or illegal activities” (p. 712). Accordingly, within a corrupt 
environment, a newcomer eventually will be confronted with corrupt beliefs, values and 
behaviors. If this person has not been socialized into corruption before, for example in his or 
her prior job, this will create a relatively intense pressure, which subsequently will lead the 
individual to either leave the organization, or change his or her attitudes in order to accept the 
corrupt practices. The socialization of new employees therefore is essential for the fact that 
corruption prevails and continues during the course of time, as it induces newcomers to go 
along with it (Anand, Ashfort & Joshi, 2004).  
Based on Ashfort and Anand (2003), the model identifies three ways- or “avenues to 
corruption” (p. 27)- in which processes of socialization lead the individual to first adopt 
corrupt practices. The first way of socialization into corruption is cooptation, a process 
through which individuals are led to accept corrupt actions by external rewards. For example, 
a finance broker might falsely advertise a certain offer as the best investment because it is 
associated with a high commission. Accordingly, a contract researcher might subtly 
manipulate his results in a way that is favorable to the sponsor (Ashfort and Anand, 2003). 
Accordingly, Stieglitz (2010), who analyzed factors contributing to the financial crises in 
2007/8, consequently found problems regarding certain compensation systems, such as stock 
options and bonus schemes, where executives profit from gains but are not tangent to losses 
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and that therefore enhance and motivate excessive risk taking. Moreover, such ubiquitous 
elements of financial markets also “encouraged the provision of misleading information” for 
example “by increasing reported income” (Stieglitz, 2010, p. 19). 
The second manner of socialization into corruption is compromise, through which individuals 
seek to solve conflict situations or dilemmas within the organizational context that seem to be 
unsolvable in an ethically, non-corrupt way. For example, a case is reported in which “a plant 
manager faced the dilemma of either venting fumes and smoke into the environment […] or 
retain them in the plant and jeopardize the health of employees” (Ashfort and Anand, 2003, 
p. 30). Because superiors were unwilling to solve this problem, the manager was led to violate 
the law, by polluting the environment, in order to solve this conflict (Ashfort and Anand, 
2003).  
Finally, there is a third mode through which individuals can be socialized into corrupt 
behavior, which is referred to as incrementalism, and that will be central for the present study, 
as we will see. Incrementalism refers to a process that is closely intertwined with 
rationalization. According to this notion, the performance of a first, slightly deviant and 
innocuous act subsequently causes an aversive state of psychological discomfort, which is 
referred to as cognitive dissonance- a construct, we will specify further below. In order to 
reduce this discomfort, the act is now rationalized, as this leads to justification and, thus, to 
acceptance of the act, as mentioned above. However, “as the individual comes to accept this 
act as normal, he or she is introduced to another, more corrupt act, with its attendant 
rationalization. In this way, the individual climbs a ladder of corruption and is eventually 
engaging in acts, he or she would have previously rejected outright” (Anand, Ashfort & 
Joshi, 2004, p. 45).  
More recently, Zyglidopoulos Fleming and Rothenberg (2009) attempted to further clarify the 
factor of rationalization, in order to specify its dynamic interaction with the process of 
incrementalism. Accordingly, a rationalization does not precisely match or fit a certain act and 
its severity. Instead, they postulated an asymmetrical relationship between a corrupt act and 
its rationalization. This means that rationalization is usually not “fine grained” but instead 
“goes far beyond what is actually required” (p. 69) in order to justify behavior. For example, 
within the case of WorldCom, they found that relatively mild acts had been rationalized by 
stating that “we do this to save a great firm” (p. 69). Therefore, this over-rationalization does 
not only justify the initial act, but exceeds it, and thus, has an impact on future actions. As 
assumed, this is the case because now “more severe and serious forms of corruption” are 
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facilitated “by the very fact that a justification is already available” (p. 70). Subsequently, 
when indeed another, more severe act is performed due to this facilitation, this will, in turn, 
trigger “a more grandiose justification and so on” (p.70). For example, in the WorldCom 
case, it was found that the primary rationalization soon became stronger by stating that “we 
do this to save our great economy” (Zyglidopoulos, Fleming & Rothenberg, 2009, p.69). 
The escalation on an organizational level 
In addition, according to Fleming and Zyglidopoulos (2008), this process of incrementalism- 
which they referred to as an escalation of behavior, because through such a process the initial 
act can subsequently increase in its severity, ease and pervasiveness- does not only have an 
effect on an individual level, but also evolves from the individual and group level to an 
organization-wide phenomenon. According to their assumptions, when severity of deception 
increases, it also begins to spread within the organization. This is because the initial deceit 
eventually exceeds the control of the individuals involved and thus, requires other people to 
get involved. By spreading in a way that requires more and more people to engage in 
deception, the initial act eventually becomes an organizational level deception. However, 
several organizational factors were proposed, which interact with this process and can amplify 
as well as hinder it. Most importantly, the factor of organizational complexity, which refers to 
“a significant level of differentiation and specialization within the organization” (p. 842), has 
an amplifying effect on the escalation. For example, most “participants in the WorldCom 
case knew that the company was in serious trouble, but the labyrinthine complexity of the 
deceit divided the everyday process of lying into less alarming acts” (p. 842). On the other 
hand, this process could be halted from spreading throughout the organization by effective 
control systems that detect such acts, for example by internal audits. Moreover, integrated and 
incorporated ethic codes within the organization could impede the involvement of other 
employees, and thus, deceit could be hindered from prevailing because such ethic codes could 
entail a lack of incentives or difficulties to rationalize the act. Thus, the incremental process of 
escalation can, in interaction with external, organizational factors, become an institutionalized 
phenomenon (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2008). 
The socialization into corruption through an authority’s order 
Generally, the described interaction between incremental socialization processes and 
rationalization, which can subsequently lead to an escalation of corrupt practices on an 
individual, but also on an organizational level, contribute to the understanding of the features 
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Anand, Ashfort and Joshi (2004), as well as other researchers (e.g Zyglidopoulos, Fleming & 
Rothenberg, 2009) had found to be commonly associated with several cases of organizational 
corruption. First, the notion of an incremental escalation of corruption, which spreads 
throughout the organization, can explain why these acts were not isolated incidents, but 
embedded in a broader organizational context, and continued and prevailed over long periods 
of time. Second, the specific interaction between socialization processes, such as 
incrementalism, and rationalization tactics can contribute to the explanation of why it often 
were upright citizens engaged in cases of corruption. The rationalization and its subsequent 
justification of behavior can also explain why these individuals did not view themselves as 
corrupt. Finally, socialization processes can explain how new employees, who hadn’t have 
been engaged in corruption before, adopted such practices when confronted with them in the 
new environment (Anand, Ashfort & Joshi, 2004). 
The three general ways of socialization- cooptation, compromise, incrementalism-, in which 
an individual can be induced to first engage in corrupt behavior, are closely intertwined and 
interacting. For example, a newcomer might decide to perform a slightly deviant and 
innocuous act because he or she is forced into a compromise situation, in which an external 
demand, for example from veteran co-workers or a supervisor, contradicts the own views 
regarding right behavior. In order to avoid negative consequences stemming from 
contradiction and disobedience, such as omitted rewards, for example by being denied a 
promotion, the newcomer decides to comply. The following performance of such an act, 
however, subsequently triggers rationalization, and, as a result, can initiate the described 
process of incremental escalation (Ashfort and Anand, 2003). 
As this example illustrates, regarding the reasons an individual decides to first engage in a 
corrupt act, there is another critical factor. Brief, Buttram and Dukerich (2001) stated that 
corruption can be initiated by sanctioned corruption, which means that a corrupt act is 
officially endorsed or condoned. This sanctioned corruption can be achieved explicitly, in a 
direct manner, or implicitly, in an indirect manner. “A direct order to engage in a corrupt 
practice represents explicit sanctioning; and, the creation of a corporate climate emphasizing 
results without regard to means is an example of implicit sanctioning” (p. 472). Accordingly, 
a first act of wrongdoing can be “officially ordered or condoned” (p. 472) by an authority 
figure (Brief, Buttram & Dukerich, 2001). Thus, a situation as described in the previous 
example could, for instance, occur if “a manager casually suggests that a subordinate lie to a 
client” (Ashfort and Anand, 2003, p. 32).  
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However, the question regarding newcomers is, “why might they comply” (p. 476) to such an 
order? (Brief, Buttram & Dukerich, 2001). An answer could be provided by the findings of 
Stanley Milgram, who literally managed to “shock the world” (Blass, 2004, p. x) in his 1974 
experiment regarding obedience to authority. He found that presumably normal individuals 
could be led to inflict painful and dangerously high electric shocks to another person, when 
ordered to do so by an authority figure (Blass, 2004). Participants, who were told to play a 
“teacher”, were ordered to administer such an electric shock after each incorrect answer given 
by a “student”, who was really a confederate of the experimenter, with gradually increasing 
severity- from 15 volts to 450 volts. The participants were told that the purpose of this was to 
examine the impact of punishments on learning. In reality, however, “the aim of this 
investigation was to find when and how people would defy authority […]” (Milgram, 1974, p. 
4). However, 65 % of Milgram’s participants, which were all ordinary and upright 
individuals, didn’t defy the authority at all, but instead behaved obediently throughout the 
entire experiment (Milgram, 1974). Accordingly, Zimbardo (1974) noted that Milgram’s 
studies made the world realize that „evil deeds are rarely the product of evil people acting 
from evil motives, but are the product of good bureaucrats simply doing their job“ (p. 566).  
In accordance with Milgram’s finding, Brief, Buttram and Dukerich (2001) noted that “a 
capacity for obedience to hierarchical authority is bred into the organism […]” (p. 478). 
Thus, regarding organizational corruption, they suggested that the nature of the hierarchical 
relationship between superior and subordinate within organizations is crucial in order to 
answer the question why an individual decides to comply with the order to behave corruptly. 
As they postulated, the individual behaves obediently, because the authority figure is 
perceived as legitimate, since it holds the power to punish disobedience but also to reward 
obedience, due to this hierarchical structure. Hence, an individual could decide to comply 
with the order, and perform the first corrupt act of the incremental process, simply out of 
obedience to an authority figure (Brief, Buttram & Dukerich, 2001). 
The internalization of corrupt acts 
In accordance with the notion of escalation of corrupt practices throughout the organization, 
described above, Brief, Buttram and Dukerich (2001) postulated another important feature 
that contributes to the explanation of how corruption can become institutionalized, which 
means the “the collective wrongdoing becomes part and parcel of everyday organizational 
life” (Brief, Buttram & Dukerich, 2001, p. 473). An essential requirement for the incremental 
escalation of corruption, both, on an individual and on an institutional level, is the process of 
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internalization, because once an act is internalized, it will be “reframed as moral and 
positive” (Lowell, 2011, p. 22), and perceived as acceptable. Internalization is the result of 
rationalization and justification of the own wrongdoings, through which the attitudes are 
brought into line with the demanded act, in order to match the own behavior. However, this 
means that once the deviant practices are internalized, and there is a consistency between 
attitudes and behavior, there is no need for further orders by an authority figure, because 
compliance will continue automatically. Hence, through the process of “internalization, new 
inhabitants of corrupt organizations themselves become corrupt, thus perpetuating a culture 
for ethical deviance and the wrongdoings this culture has produced” (Brief, Buttram & 
Dukerich, 2001, p. 488).  
So far, we have seen that within a more complex and dynamic approach to the understanding 
and explanation of corruption, an individual can be socialized into corruption in various, 
closely interacting ways. For example, a first, slightly deviant act can be explicitly ordered by 
an authority figure. Moreover, we have also seen that a dynamic process between 
rationalization and corrupt acts is postulated. This process is theorized to contribute to the fact 
that, within numerous cases of organizational corruption, corrupt deeds incrementally 
escalated- both, on an individual and an organizational level- by becoming increasingly severe 
and increasingly easy to perform. Figure 2 illustrates a simplified schematic integration of the 
models described above. 
Institutionalization Corrupt practices spread Internalization of corrupt practices
throughout organization
Socialization
-Cooptaion
-Comprimise Initial Act Cognitive Dissonance Rationalization Acceptance of act
-Incrementalism
-Authority‘s order                                                                                                    
Performance of more severe acts
 
Figure 2. The process of incremental escalation of a corrupt act from the individual to the 
organizational level. (Ashfort and Anand, 2003; Brief, Buttram & Dukerich, 2001; Anand, 
Ashfort & Joshi, 2004; Zyglidopoulos, Fleming & Rothenberg, 2009: Fleming and 
Zyglidopoulos, 2008).  
The escalating dynamic, illustrated in Figure 2, is explained by the underlying rationalization 
of a relatively innocuous but dissonance arousing act, which is initially performed due to 
socialization forces, for example an authority figure’s demand. The rationalization 
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subsequently justifies the act and renders it more and more acceptable. On the one hand, this 
leads to the act’s internalization, which means that the original attitude towards it has been 
altered, and the act is now performed without direct external pressure. On the other hand, 
once the initial act has been rationalized and psychologically accepted, this facilitates the 
performance of further such acts, even if severity increases. Once the corrupt practices have 
reached a certain severity, other participants are required to engage in these activities, as they 
exceed the control of a single employee. Hence, corruption spreads throughout the 
organization, so that, eventually, it will be institutionalized. This will, in turn, enhance 
socialization processes that induce newcomers to again perform such an initial act (e.g 
Ashfort and Anand, 2003; Brief, Buttram & Dukerich, 2001; Anand, Ashfort & Joshi, 2004; 
Zyglidopoulos, Fleming & Rothenberg, 2009; Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2008). 
The present study attempts to observe such an escalation as a result of obedient behavior, 
since, in the experiment, several unjustified gratifications are demanded by an authority 
figure. In regard to the typology of corrupt practices mentioned above, the negative act that is 
performed in this study can be compared to acts on the first level of corruption, such as 
illegitimate profiteering or gains of advantages. The present study also aims at further 
investigating and understanding the psychological groundwork of this escalation process by 
clarifying the role of rationalization.  
However, in order to achieve these goals, it is imperative to illuminate the concept of 
cognitive dissonance first, which was already mentioned further above. This is because, as 
Figure 2 shows, the arousal and reduction of cognitive dissonance is assumed to be the crucial 
psychological mechanism, underlying the process of incremental escalation, as it explains the 
urge to rationalize and justify the negative behavior, which subsequently leads to its 
acceptance and internalization, and that triggers the described process of escalation (Lowell, 
2011).  
In order to contribute to the understanding of corruption, it is such a dynamic process of 
incremental escalation, defined as an increase in severity of an act with a simultaneous 
decrease of resistance against it, the present study aims at experimentally finding on the 
individual level. 
Cognitive Dissonance 
In 1957, Leon Festinger first defined dissonance as an aversive, intrapersonal state of 
psychological discomfort, which is created „when an individual holds two or more elements 
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of knowledge that are relevant to each other but inconsistent with one another” (Harmon-
Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2007, p 7). For example, if a person participated in an extremely 
dull experiment and is induced to report to another person that it was actually a really 
interesting study, dissonance will arise, because the two elements of knowledge- or 
cognitions- “I know the task is very dull” and “I reported it was interesting” are inconsistent 
with one another. Therefore, within the person a discrepancy arises between behavior (saying 
it was interesting) and its opinion or attitude (thinking it was dull). This discrepancy 
subsequently causes dissonance (Kenworthy, Miller, Collins, Read & Earleywine, 2011). 
Furthermore, Festinger described dissonance as a motivational state, which drives people to 
implement strategies and tactics to reduce the perceived discrepancy that caused the 
dissonance (Elliot and Devine, 1994). “[…] being psychologically uncomfortable, will 
motivate the person to try to reduce dissonance and achieve consonance” (Festinger, 1957, p. 
3). In the given example, the person could now reevaluate the task in order to achieve 
consonance between the cognitions and hence reduce dissonance: “On reflection, the task is 
actually more interesting than I first thought.” (Kenworthy, Miller, Collins, Read & 
Earleywine, 2011, p. 37). Festinger posited that the reduction of dissonance can generally be 
achieved in three main ways: a) by modifying one or more of the inconsistent elements, for 
example an attitude or a behavior, b) by adding new elements that are consonant and therefore 
reduce the perceived discrepancy, and c) by minimizing or trivializing the importance of one 
or more dissonant elements (Gosling, Denizeau & Oberlé, 2006).  
The role of the self and societal norms in the arousal of dissonance  
During the course of time, three main revisions have been proposed by Aronson (1968), 
Steele (1988) and Cooper and Fazio (1984) (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2007). Two of 
the revisions, Aronson’s self-consistency theory as well as Steele’s self-affirmation theory, 
posit that dissonance is aroused by a behavior, which is inconsistent with the persons self-
view and therefore poses a threat to the self-concept (Stone and Cooper, 2001). The self-
concept can be defined as a cognitive schema that holds concrete as well as abstract 
knowledge about the self and therefore controls the processing of self-relevant information 
(Campbell, 1990). Moreover, as Heine et al. (1999) stated, it is a generally accepted fact in 
social psychological research that a person strives to have a positive self-view and with that a 
positive sense of him- or herself. Therefore, “since most people have a positive self-concept, 
dissonance is most often experienced when people behave negatively, behaving in an 
incompetent, irrational or immoral manner” (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2007, p. 9). 
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Or, as Aronson (1992) summarized: “What leads me to perform dissonance-reducing 
behavior is my having done something that a) astonishes me, b) makes me feel stupid, or c) 
makes me feel guilty.” (p. 305).  
Generally, self-consistency theory (Aronson, 1968), as well as self-affirmation theory (Steele, 
1988) both state that the own behavior is evaluated by comparing it to the self standards and 
self beliefs, represented in the self-concept. However, for Aronson, a feeling of threatened 
self-consistency is the central aspect of dissonance arousal. This threat is caused by an 
inconsistency between behavior and one’s self-views or self-expectancies. On the other hand, 
Steele proposes a more general threat of self-integrity or self-worth to be the main aspect and 
the source of dissonance (Kenworthy, Miller, Collins, Read & Earleywine 2011).  
Contrary to that, the New Look theory by Fazio and Cooper- the third major revision- posits 
that the act is evaluated by comparison to socially accepted norms or normative standards of 
behavior, and therefore the self is irrelevant for the dissonance process. Accordingly, 
dissonance is aroused when the own behavior violates societal norms that are perceived as 
relevant, and thus, the own behavior is rendered socially unwanted or unacceptable (Stone and 
Cooper, 2001). “The assumption is that people learn as children to monitor the fit between 
their actions and what their parents and peers believe is appropriate behavior- the perceived 
norms of behavior.” (p. 3). 
However, all theories agree that if a discrepancy between the shown behavior and a crucial 
standard is detected, dissonance is aroused (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2007). Since 
there is a great amount of research that confirms each revision (e.g. Harmon-Jones and 
Harmon-Jones, 2007, Kenworthy, Miller, Collins, Read & Earleywine, 2011), Stone and 
Cooper (2001) attempted to unify the three major revisions into their Self-Standards Model of 
Cognitive Dissonance, by stating that the crucial aspect of the arousal and reduction of 
dissonance is the standard used to evaluate and interpret the behavior. According to this 
model, the applied standard can be both, personal or normative, and hence determines the role 
of the self in the dissonance process.  
If we look at the sort of behavior, which can be observed in cases of corruption, from a 
dissonance-theoretical perspective, it now becomes clear that the actors are highly likely to 
experience dissonance after they first are led to engage in corrupt and deviant behavior. As we 
already saw, these actors are ordinary, upright and lawful people. Consequently, their act is 
likely to contradict the expectations they hold about themselves and their behavior, and 
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therefore, dissonance is aroused (Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). As Lowell (2011) adds in 
respect to cases of corruption, one can assume high levels of dissonance due to “the absence 
of sociopathic traits.” (p. 20). 
Reduction of dissonance 
As we have seen, dissonance is a state of psychological discomfort, but it is also highly 
motivational, because it drives people to seek and apply tactics and strategies to reduce this 
aversive state (Elliot and Devine, 1994).  
However, dissonance is not always experienced on an equal level. Instead, the level of 
experienced dissonance is dependent on the magnitude of the perceived discrepancy. 
Furthermore, this discrepancy is a function of the relation between inconsistent and consistent 
cognitions, together with the importance of each cognition. Thus, dependent on the cognitions 
an individual holds- both inconsistent and consistent- dissonance will vary in its magnitude. 
As a consequence, the need and striving to reduce the perceived dissonance will vary in its 
strength along with the magnitudes of dissonance (Cooper, 2007). “The strength of the 
pressure to reduce the dissonance is a function of the magnitude of the dissonance.” 
(Festinger, 1957, p. 18). Consequently, “the higher the levels of dissonance, the stronger the 
drive will be to reduce or eliminate it.” (Lowell, 2011, p. 18).  
The reduction of dissonance can be achieved by a large number of actions and strategies that 
can be separated into two overall categories. First, there are direct strategies, which reduce 
dissonance by directly reducing the experienced discrepancy between behavior and cognitions 
(Stone, Wiegand, Cooper & Aronson, 1997). This can be achieved by changing an attitude, a 
value, or an opinion, as well as adding one or more cognitions that reduce the perceived 
inconsistency directly. Also, the inconsistency can be reduced directly by trivializing its 
importance (Simon, Greenberg & Brehm, 1995). 
Second, there are indirect strategies, which reduce dissonance but leave the discrepancy 
intact. “These include misattributing the discomfort to something other than the discrepancy 
or reflecting on other valued aspects of the self.” (Stone, Wiegand, Cooper & Aronson, 1997, 
p. 54). Likewise, individuals can engage in any sort of distraction or, for example, consume 
alcohol. These modes of dissonance reduction are unrelated to the discrepancy itself that 
caused dissonance (Stone, Wiegand, Cooper & Aronson, 1997). 
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The choice of a specific mode of dissonance reduction seems to be depended on multiple 
factors, such as the importance of the threatened self-cognitions or the circumstances of the 
behavior. Hence, “people have a tremendous flexibility when it comes to selecting a strategy 
for dissonance reduction.” (p. 54). However, if both routes of dissonance reduction – direct 
and indirect- are available to the individual, there is a tendency to confront the dissonance 
arousing discrepancy directly (Stone, Wiegand, Cooper & Aronson, 1997). 
Dissonance and the societal norm of obedience to authorities 
As we have seen above, regarding the circumstances in cases of organizational corruption, the 
power of authority plays an important role. For example, Anand, Ashfort and Joshi (2004) 
quote a manager who was involved in corruption and noted that “[…] I just gotta do what the 
boss says.” (p.42). As Milgram’s results demonstrate, it generally seems to be difficult for 
people to disobey an authority figure’s demand in the first place: “Perhaps our culture does 
not provide adequate models for disobedience.” (Milgram, 1965, p. 67). Similarly, Festinger 
argued that a change in behavior in order to reduce dissonance directly may not be possible 
“simply because the new behavior may not be in the behavior repertoire of the person” 
(Festinger, 1957, p. 26). Accordingly, Zimbardo (1974) criticized „our mindless obedience to 
rules, to expectations, and to people playing at being authorities” (p. 566), which make it so 
difficult for people to disobey and refuse an authority’s demand. In accordance with Cooper 
and Fazio’s New Look Model, these notions suggests that, within our society, disobedience 
against an authority figure seems to be a behavior that violates societal norms and standards, 
and thus is unwanted, rather unacceptable and, as a result, dissonance arousing.  
Therefore, regarding the direct modes of dissonance reduction, it can be concluded that if 
altering the own behavior implies disobeying and contradicting an authority figure, there 
might be a general tendency to prefer to reduce dissonance by adjusting attitudes or opinions, 
which in turn provide a way to justify the demanded behavior, instead of changing the 
behavior itself. Moreover, the more an individual tends to accept and follow authorities and 
thus, the higher an individual’s tendency to be submissive to an authority figure’s demand, the 
stronger this preference should be in order to avoid contradiction and disobedience (Nicol, 
2007).  
Dissonance reduction through rationalization and the escalation of behavior 
As we have seen, in a situation where one decides to exhibit an act which poses a threat to the 
self, for example because the only alternative would be to disobey an authority figure, 
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dissonance should be aroused. One mode to reduce this dissonance directly without changing 
the inconsistent behavior itself is to justify the performed act. As mentioned above, this 
justification can be achieved through processes of rationalization (Beauvois, 2001). 
Accordingly, as Aronson’s theory posits, by rationalizing and justifying the discrepant 
behavior, a person is attempting to maintain or restore a sense of morality, competence and 
consistence in order to alleviate the perceived threat to the self (Kenworthy, Miller, Collins, 
Read & Earleywine, 2011).  
This means that by rationalizing an inconsistent act, the perceived discrepancy between the 
act and the self-concept can be reduced with the self-concept remaining intact (Thibodeau & 
Aronson, 1992). However, this also means that the value attributed to an act will change as 
soon as the act has been rationalized, and that the justified act will further be experienced as 
more acceptable or less negative. As a consequence, if the act is demanded a second time, 
now resistance should be smaller than the first time because, after rationalizing it, the act 
should be perceived as more acceptable (Beauvois, 2001). 
Moreover, if the act is demanded several more times with gradually increasing severity, the 
resistance should further and gradually decrease, because rationalization should occur after 
each act to the degree the actor feels dissonance due to the remaining perception of 
discrepancy between act and self-concept. As Staw (1976) stated, such a “cyclical process 
[…] is due to a need to justify prior behavior” through which “a decision maker may increase 
his commitment in the face of negative consequences, and this higher level of commitment 
may, in turn, lead to further negative consequences.” (p. 29). Hence, rationalization of a 
dissonance arousing act „[…] starts a process of entrapment- action, justification, further 
action- that increases our intensity and our commitment, and may end up taking us far from 
our original intentions or principles“ (Tavris, & Aronson, 2007, p. 34).  
In accordance with these notions, Zyglidopoulos, Fleming and Rothenberg (2009) theorized 
that the dynamic process underlying organizational corruption is fueled by “excessive 
rationalization” (p.69) that “allows the individual to justify past or future actions.” (p. 68). 
The escalation of behavior within the phenomenon of organizational corruption thus might be 
theoretically explained by the assumption that “individuals facing cognitive dissonance 
‘rationalize away’ deeds that […] contradict […] or are in conflict with their self-
concept.”(p. 67). 
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Overview of the present study 
Before the study is described in detail further below, it is helpful to illustrate certain important 
features for better understanding.  
The conflict 
Generally, in order to find the escalation process empirically, we created a role play, in which 
participants were asked to play an “accountant” and agreed to comply with the written 
instructions, which were given to them together with a role description, and that clearly stated 
that gratifications, which increased for each task, were only to be paid out when the second 
participant- a confederate of the experimenter- successfully solved a calculation task.  
During the experiment however, the experimenter suddenly and unexpectedly orders the 
“accountant” to disregard the instructions he or she had originally agreed upon, and hand out 
the money despite the wrong answer, which was given by the confederate. This demand 
creates a conflict because the participant is now left with two alternatives. 
First, the participant could decide to obey the authority and exhibit the demanded act in order 
to avoid contradiction and disobedience, which, as we have seen, is something rather 
untypically and unwanted in our culture. This however, leads the participant to act in a 
manner which contradicts his or her behavior from prior in the experiment, as well as the 
instructions the participant had explicitly and openly agreed upon. Thus, performing the 
authority’s demand should generate a feeling of inconsistency and foolishness within the 
participant due to the discrepancy between the shown behavior and the own general sense of 
being a competent, principled and consistent acting individual. As a consequence of this 
discrepancy between behavior and self-concept, dissonance should be aroused.  
Alternatively, the participant could decide to avoid such an act that should generate feelings 
of inconsistency and heteronomy- and therefore a negative, inconsistent sense of self. 
However, this implies refusal of the demanded act and, hence, disobedience against the 
authority figure. Since disobedience seems to be rendered rather inappropriate in regard to 
societal norms and standards of behavior, it should consequently arouse dissonance.  
The general conflict can therefore be separated into an external one- contradicting and 
disobeying an authority figure- and an internal one- performing an inconsistent act that poses 
a threat to the self.  
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As we have stated further above in regard to the impact of authorities on modes of dissonance 
reduction, we assume that the majority of participants will preferably decide to engage in the 
internal conflict, instead of the external one. This, however, should lead a number of 
participants to justify the act through rationalization, which in turn is assumed to entrap them 
in a process of escalation that has been theorized to play an important role in organizational 
corruption.  
Phases of the experiment 
Before the experiment is reported in detail, it is also important to note that the experiment can 
be separated into four different phases. As mentioned above, the amount of money, which was 
defined for each task, constantly increased from one task to the other, and therefore also from 
one phase to the other. Thus, the severity of the act constantly increased, with its low at the 
very beginning, and its peak at the very last task.  
In the beginning-phase, there were a total of five conflicts arising. As we assume, during this 
phase, the inconsistent act should be reframed as acceptable by participants who rationalized 
it.  
As a consequence, in the second-phase, the act should be internalized by participants who 
rationalized it. During this phase, the authority figure was physically absent and, hence, could 
not repeat the order. Therefore, in two occurring conflict situation (wrong answer given by the 
confederate) it was assessed whether the participant performed the act in the absences of the 
authority figure (internalization), or if the participants decided to act in accordance with the 
originally agreed upon rules, and gives no money for the wrong answer (non-internalization).  
The return-phase was characterized by the reappearance of the authority figure. This phase 
consisted of one conflict, similar to those from the beginning-phase. Finally, in the end-phase, 
the confederate of the experimenter refused any effort whatsoever, to solve the calculation 
tasks. However, if necessary, the authority nonetheless repeated the order to pay the money. 
Thus, the two occurring conflicts in this phase were somewhat more extreme, because there 
was not only a wrong answer given, but no answer at all. The phases are illustrated in Figure 
3, further below. 
Dependent Variables 
Amount of protest. In order to find the theorized escalation of behavior, it was necessary to 
determine the strength of participants’ disobedience throughout the experiment, because this 
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shows whether resistance against the demanded act decreased in the face of increasing 
severity. Therefore, we measured the amount of protest against the authority’s demand for 
every occurring conflict (with exception of the conflicts in the second-phase, where the 
authority is absent and thus, no protest could be expressed).  
Generally, there were four steps of increasingly urgent demands, in which the act was ordered 
by the authority figure. Once a wrong answer was given by the confederate, the experimenter 
formulated the first demand. Moreover, if the participant refused to obey the first order, a 
second, stronger demand was formulated. If again the participant refused to obey, a third, 
even stronger demand followed, and, if the third demand too was rejected by the participant, a 
fourth and final demand was formulated.  
However, the very first demand was only formulated if the participant wanted to act according 
to the originally established instructions, and proceed to the next task without handing out any 
money, after a wrong answer was given. If, however, the participant already complied with 
the authority’s demand, and paid out the money as soon as a wrong answer was given, 
naturally, the demand was not repeated. Following, the different steps from 0 to 4 are listed 
with their specific demands, which are formulated by the experimenter.  
0: The participant performs the act without the authority having to demanding it again.  
1. “Please hand out the money anyway!“  
2. “It is important that you pay out the money anyway!”  
3. “It is indispensable that you hand out the money!”  
4. “You don’t have a choice, you have to hand out the money!”  
During the experiment, the experimenter assessed- on a paper in front of him- how many 
times he had to repeat the demand, till the participant decided to obey the order. In this way, 
the amount of protest was measured for each conflict. For example, if a participant obeyed the 
order after the second demand, the amount of protest was labeled “2” for that conflict. If he or 
she obeyed the order after the third demand, the amount of protest was labeled “3”, and so on.  
Termination. Moreover, we also assessed whether the experiment was terminated by the 
participant or not. If the participant disobeyed all of the four demands described above, he 
reached a fifth stage, at which the experiment was terminated. The experimenter accordingly 
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categorized each participant into “(0): participants who didn’t terminate” or “(1): participants 
who terminated” on a paper in front of him.  
Internalization. As mentioned, the amount of protest against the order and termination of the 
experiment could only be assessed when the authority was present. In the second-phase, 
however, the authority was physically absent. In this second-phase, we therefore assessed 
whether participants internalized the demand or not. Hence, as mentioned, once a wrong 
answer was given by the confederate, it was assessed whether the participant performed the 
act and paid out the money, even when the experimenter was absent (internalization), or if he 
or she decided to act according to the originally established instructions (non internalization). 
This was assessed for each participant by the confederate on a paper in front of him. Thus, the 
confederate categorized each participant into “(0): participants who internalized” or “(1): 
participants who didn’t internalize”. 
Affectivity. After the experiment, affectivity of participants was assessed. Participants 
described their affectivity on a bi-polar 7-point scale, we created. The affectivity was 
described by the location on a continuum between the two poles for each of the following five 
scales: tens vs. relaxed, unsatisfied vs. satisfied, agitated vs. calm, nervous vs. placid, bored 
vs. interested.  
Independent Variables 
Mode of disbursement. In order to assess the effect of severity of the act on the amount of 
protest, we created two conditions, in which the modes of disbursement differed. In one 
condition, there was a linear mode of disbursement. The amount of money that had to be 
disbursed by the participant constantly increased with two Euros from one item to the next, so 
that there was an overall increase from four Euros to 40 Euros throughout the experiment. In 
the second condition, there was an exponential mode, in which the amount of money 
increased by an exponent of 1.25 from one item to the next. In this mode, there was an overall 
increase from one Euro to 90 Euros. The general amount of money, which had to be disbursed 
in the experiment, was similar in both conditions, with 418 Euros for the linear and 400 Euros 
for the exponential condition. However, in every conflict of the beginning-phase of the 
experiment, the amount of disbursed money is higher in the linear condition, while, for every 
conflict in the return- and end phase the amount his higher in the exponential condition. Thus, 
the severity of the act differs throughout the experiment between the two conditions. The 
different conditions are further illustrated in Figure 3 below.  
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Personality Factors. We also include variables regarding personality that may contribute to 
the willingness to behave obediently towards the authority figure and to the process of 
escalation. 
RWA. The short-version of the RWA scale by Rattazzi, Bobbio and Canova (2007) was used 
in this experiment. It is based on the concept of Right-Wing Authoritarianism and consists of 
the two subscales of “authoritarian aggression and submission” and “conservatism”. While 
conservatism refers to the tendency to strictly adhere to conventional norms and values, 
authoritarian submission refers to the tendency of being uncritically submissive to authority 
figures. Authoritarian aggression, which is closely related to authoritarian submission, refers 
to the tendency to generate feelings of aggression towards norm violators. In total, the test 
consists of 30 items, with ten items for each of the three factors (Rattazzi, Bobbio and 
Canova, 2007). 
SDO. The SDO-6 by Pratto et al. (1994), which consists of 16 items was also used. It 
measures the construct of Social Dominance Orientation that is based on Social Dominance 
Theory, and which refers to the tendency to accept hierarchies of dominance, in which society 
is structured and organized. According to the position within this hierarchy, a group of people 
is entitled to advantages (Nicol, 2007). 
BIG-5. We included the Big Five questionnaire version by Satow (2011). It consists of five 
subscales. Neuroticism refers to a person’s tendency to be emotional labile and anxious, as 
compared to emotionally stable. Extraversion refers to a person’s tendency to be sociable, 
expressive and outgoing, as compared to being withdrawn into oneself. Conscientiousness 
refers to a person’s tendency to be thorough and conscientious. Agreeableness refers to a 
person’s tendency to be popular and prosaically, as compared to socially less adapted. 
Openness refers to a person’s tendency to be open-minded and eager to experiment, as 
compared to traditional and uncurious. In general, there are 50 items, with ten items for each 
personality trait (Satow, 2011). 
Roccas et al. (2002) have examined each factor of the Big Five and its associations with 
different kinds of values. Accordingly, we are able to formulate assumptions regarding protest 
in our experiment and the five different personality traits further below. 
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Hypothesis 
In order to examine the data, participants were clustered into different groups, based on the 
assessment of termination and internalization, as described above. Therefore, three groups of 
participants emerged: Participants who internalized the demand, participants who didn’t 
internalize the demand, and participants who terminated the experiment. 
Based on the theoretical background and the description of the present study, the following 
hypotheses are derived:  
H1.1: The average amount of protest will directly decrease during the experiment for 
participants who internalize the demand. 
According to our assumptions, internalization of the act is the result of rationalization 
processes. By rationalizing it, the participant should render the demanded act psychologically 
acceptable to an extent, which then leads him or her to perform the act even when there is no 
experimenter present who explicitly demands it. Consequently, there should be a decrease of 
protest during the beginning-phase of the experiment due to an increase of acceptance of the 
act. After the second-phase, when participants decided to perform the act without any direct 
demand, protest should further decrease. This is the case because severity of the act further 
increases and, therefore, rationalization should be used to further increase psychological 
acceptance of the act, which subsequently leads to lower protest. Thus, due to the effect of 
dissonance reduction through rationalization, which renders the demanded act psychologically 
acceptable, an escalation in behavior is assumed, that is, a decrease of protest in the face of 
increasing severity (e.g Zyglidopoulos, Fleming & Rothenberg, 2009; Beauvois, 2001; 
Lowell, 2011). 
H1.2 The average amount of protest will not directly decrease during the experiment for 
participants who do not internalize. 
We assume that the effect of directly decreasing protest in the face of increasing severity 
cannot be observed in this group. Since they decide not to internalize the demand in the 
second-phase, we argue that they do not render the act psychologically acceptable in the 
beginning-phase. Accordingly, we assume that within this group, no rationalization processes 
are used in order to reduce dissonance, as this would lead to an increase of the act’s 
acceptance (e.g Zyglidopoulos, Fleming & Rothenberg, 2009; Beauvois, 2001; Lowell, 2011). 
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As a consequence, we conclude that a decrease in the amount of protest cannot be found in 
the beginning-phase, prior to the second-phase. Moreover, this enduring resistance against the 
act, which is openly demonstrated, should reduce the perceived inconsistency between 
behavior and self-concept. While the demanded act should be perceived as inconsistent, 
resistance itself should be consistent with the own sense of self and thereby add a consistent 
cognition, which reduces the perceived discrepancy between behavior and self. Hence, the 
demanded act might be inconsistent and incompatible with self-concept, but by openly 
disapproving it, the participant behaves in a manner that should enable him or her to maintain 
a relatively positive self-concept of being a competent and consistent acting individual (e.g. 
Cooper, 2007; Simon, Greenberg & Brehm, 1995; Thibodeau and Aronson, 1992). 
Consequently, after the second-phase, where participants refused to perform the act, protest 
should also not decrease in the return- and end-phase. This should be the case, because, 
contrary to the group of internalization, no rationalization is used that leads to higher 
acceptance of the act and to lower resistance in the face of increasing severity. Thus, in the 
overall experiment, the absolute amount of protest should not directly decrease (e.g 
Zyglidopoulos, Fleming & Rothenberg, 2009; Beauvois, 2001; Lowell, 2011). 
H1.3: The average amount of protest during the beginning-phase, as well as the return-
and end-phase will be higher for participants who don’t internalize than for participants 
who internalize the demand.  
As we argue, participants who decided to perform the act in the second-phase, should show 
less protest in the beginning- phase due to the rationalization that led to the psychological 
acceptance needed for the decision to internalize the act.  
Moreover, after performing the act even when the experimenter is absent, protest of 
participants who internalize should again be lower in the return- and end-phase, as compared 
to participants who don’t internalize, because increasing severity of the act should 
subsequently trigger stronger rationalization that further reduces protest. Contrary to that, 
participants who don’t internalize the demand should not render the act psychologically 
acceptable throughout the experiment, as we assume, and, accordingly, express this refusal of 
acceptance by protesting against it. Thus, protest within this group should be higher than in 
the other group of participants (e.g Zyglidopoulos, Fleming & Rothenberg, 2009; Beauvois, 
2001; Lowell, 2011). 
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H2.1 The average amount of protest for participants who internalize will be lower in the 
beginning-phase of the experiment when there is a linear mode of disbursement. 
The higher the severity of an inconsistent act- in our case the disbursed amount of money- the 
stronger the need to justify it should be. As we have seen, this is the case, because the 
perceived discrepancy between act an self-concept should increase together with the act’s 
severity. This is because the act is perceived as an inconsistent cognition, which becomes 
more relevant as it becomes more severe. Accordingly, the increasing discrepancy should 
result in higher magnitudes of dissonance. The magnitude of perceived dissonance should in 
turn lead to a corresponding strength of rationalization, since stronger rationalization is 
needed to reduce greater discrepancies between behavior and self. Subsequently, the stronger 
the rationalization of the act, the greater its acceptance should be and thus, the weaker the 
protest. In the beginning-phase of the experiment, the disbursement is higher in every conflict 
for the linear mode compared to the exponential mode. Hence, the need of justification should 
also be higher in the linear mode, leading to stronger rationalization and lower amounts of 
protest (e.g. Cooper, 2007; Festinger,1957; Simon, Greenberg & Brehm, 1995, Lowell, 2011). 
H2.2 The average amount of protest for participants who do not internalize will not 
differ significantly in the beginning-phase between the exponential mode and linear 
mode of disbursement. 
Since we assume that within this group, dissonance is not reduced by rationalization processes 
that render the act psychologically more acceptable, higher severity in the linear mode during 
conflicts of the beginning-phase should not lead to lower protest (e.g. Beauvois, 2001; 
Cooper, 2007). 
H2.3 The average amount of protest for participants who internalize will be lower in the 
end-phase of the experiment when there is an exponential mode of disbursement. 
During the end-phase, protest should be lower in the exponential mode due to higher amounts 
of money that are demanded to be disbursed. As we have already argued above, this increase 
in severity of the act should lead to higher magnitudes of dissonance and therefore to stronger 
rationalization processes in order to reduce it. Hence, for participants who internalize, less 
protest should occur when severity of the act is higher (e.g. Cooper, 2007; Lowell, 2011). 
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H2.4 The average amount of protest for participants who do not internalize will not 
differ significantly in the return- and end-phase between the exponential mode and 
linear mode of disbursement. 
We postulate this hypothesis according to H 2.2 
H3 Participants who internalize are calmer, more placid, satisfied, relaxed and less 
interested than participants who don’t internalize.   
We argue that participants who internalize the demand should experience less dissonance than 
participants who don’t internalize, because, as mentioned, they are rendering the act 
psychologically acceptable. Therefore, they should reduce dissonance more successfully, 
which should lead to lower amounts of protest and, accordingly, to an affectivity of minor 
psychological discomfort.  
On the other hand, we assume that participants who don’t internalize the demand do not 
increase its acceptance, because they are not rationalizing the act, as mentioned. However, as 
they are still behaving obediently and performing the unaccepted act, dissonance should be 
higher and thus, the reported affectivity should be more negative (e.g. Festinger, 1957; 
Aronson, 1968; Cooper, 2007). 
H4.1 Terminations of the experiment occur more often in the beginning-phase than in 
the later phases.  
For these participants, the demanded act is unacceptable to an extent, which evokes enough 
protest for the termination of the experiment. As a consequence, we assume that terminations 
must be taken place in the beginning-phase of the experiment, because they refuse to 
rationalize or justify the act in order to render it psychologically acceptable. This should 
subsequently evoke the degree of disobedience needed to terminate the experiment, as soon as 
the first conflicts arise ( Simon, Greenberg & Brehm, 1995; Beauvois, 2001). 
H4.2 There is no difference in termination rate between modes of disbursement. 
Since the demanded act itself is perceived as negative to an extent, which evokes enough 
protest for the experiment to be terminated, and no rationalization is used to reduce 
dissonance, we assume that its differing severity between the modes of disbursement should 
not have an impact (Beauvois, 2001). 
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H4.3 Participants who terminate the experiment on average express more protest per 
conflict than participants who do not terminate.  
As we argue, participants who terminate the experiment should on average express more 
protest per conflict than participants who don’t terminate, because they don’t increase the acts 
acceptance through rationalization and therefore render the act more negatively (e.g. 
Beauvois, 2001; Lowell, 2011). 
H4.4 Participants who internalize are calmer, more placid, satisfied, relaxed and less 
interested than participants who terminate the experiment.   
As noted, we assume that participants who internalize reduce dissonance most successfully. 
Moreover, for participants who terminate the experiment, engaging strongly in the external 
conflict with the authority should arouse some dissonance, as it is assumed to violate societal 
norms. Thus, Participants who terminate should perceive more dissonance than participants 
who internalize. Accordingly, the differing amounts of dissonance should lead to reported 
affectivity states as hypothesized (e.g. Cooper and Fazio, 1984; Harmon-Jones and Harmon-
Jones, 2007; Kenworthy, Collins, Read and Earleywine, 2011). 
H5.1: There is a negative association between protest and RWA-score 
As mentioned, the RWA can be separated into two subscales. The construct of authoritarian 
submission refers to the tendency of an uncritical submission to authority figures. In our 
opinion, this trait of authoritarian submission is a relevant factor for disobedience. This is 
because we assume that the degree to which disobedience against an authority figure is 
perceived as violation of societal standards and norms should be influenced by this trait. 
Therefore, we assume that protest is negatively correlated with the construct of authoritarian 
submission, because the higher the tendency to behave submissively, the lower the amount or 
degree of protest a participant is willing or capable to express should be. Moreover, we also 
assume that protest is negatively correlated with conservatism as it refers to the tendency to 
adhere conventional values and norms. Consequently, a negative relationship between RWA-
score and amount of protest is expected (Nicol, 2007; Cooper and Fazio, 1984). 
H5.2: There is a negative association between protest and SDO-score 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) refers to a person’s tendency to accept and believe in 
social hierarchies, which state the position within society for different groups of people. We 
therefore assume a negative correlation between protest and SDO because higher scoring 
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participants should perceive the authority as more powerful and legitimate, which 
consequently should lead to less protest against the experimenters demand (Pratto, Sidanius; 
Stallworth and Malle, 1994; Nicol, 2007). 
H5.3 There is a negative association between protest and conscientiousness 
We expect a negative relationship between the amount of protest and conscientiousness due to 
its association with the tendency to avoid disruption of social order. Moreover, it is associated 
positively with conformity (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz & Knafo, 2002). 
H5.4 There is a positive relationship between protest and neuroticism 
We expect a positive relationship between the amount of protest and neuroticism because it 
has been found to correlate with the impulsive tendency to outward negative emotions and 
thereby disregard values of tradition and conformity (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz & Knafo, 
2002). 
H5.5. There is a positive relationship between protest and openness. 
We expect a positive relationship between the amount of protest and openness to experience. 
The trait has been found to be most compatible with autonomy in an intellectual and 
emotional sense, and to relate negatively to conformity (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz & Knafo, 
2002). 
H5.6 There is a positive relationship between protest and extraversion. 
We expect a positive relationship between the amount of protest an extraversion because it 
has been found to be “antithetical to valuing self-denial or self-abnegation, expressed in 
traditional values” (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz & Knafo, 2002, p.795).  
H5.7 There is a negative relationship between protest and agreeableness  
We expect a negative relationship between the amount of protest and agreeableness. This is 
because it has been found to associate with the tendency to fulfill social obligations and 
comply with social norms (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz & Knafo, 2002). 
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2. Method and Results 
Participants 
In total, we tested 90 participants, 70 of which were female and 20 of which were male. The 
age ranges between 18 and 42 years with a mean age of 22,5 years. 4 participants had a 
university degree and 86 participants had the ‘Matura’ high school degree. 2 participants were 
excluded due to incomplete data.  
Procedure and Design 
As already noted, the experiment was conducted as a role-play, which we have developed 
loosely following the studies of Milgram. Therefore, three persons were present during the 
experiment itself: the authority figure and two participants. Similar to Milgram, one 
participant was really a confederate of the experimenter, playing the role of the person, who, 
in our study, had to solve mental arithmetic tasks. The confederate and the participant were 
sitting at a table with a view-block in its middle, so that they were able to hear but not see 
each other. The experimenter (authority figure) was sitting on a table next to them, from 
where he was able to maintain eye contact to both of the others. Moreover, on the table in 
front of them they each had different papers. The accountant first had the instruction papers, 
which, as noted, stated that a defined amount of money was to be paid to the other participant 
for each correctly given answer. If, however, the answer for a task was wrong, there would be 
no payment. Moreover, on this instruction paper there were all of the 19 tasks and two 
additional ‘warming-up’ tasks. The correct answer for each task was also stated, so that the 
‘accountant’ was able to verify the answers given by the confederate. Secondly, the 
‘accountant’ was given another paper where the amount of money, which had to be paid out 
for a correct answer, was defined for each of the 19 tasks, and finally, there was a pile of 
money in front of the ‘accountant’, from which-according to the instructions- he had to pay 
the defined gratifications for each correct answer.  
The confederate, on the other hand, seemingly was also given an instruction paper. In reality, 
however, there was each correct answer for each task stated on this paper. Moreover, there 
was also stated for each task if the confederate had to give a correct or an incorrect answer. As 
illustrated in Figure 3 below, the occurrence of the conflicts was standardized and, thus, 
wrong answers were given at the same tasks for each participant. Finally, on this paper, the 
confederate also noted if the participant internalized the act in the second phase, by stating 
either “0” (internalized) or “1” (not internalized) in the according box, as described.  
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As mentioned, the experimenter also had a paper in front of him, on which the amount of 
protest was noted for each conflict for each participant. Moreover, the experimenter also 
noted the condition (linear or exponential) for each participant on this paper, and whether they 
terminated the experiment or not, by stating either “0” (not terminated) or “1” (terminated) in 
the according box. 
The procedure of the experiment was as follows: After the participant and the confederate 
appeared in the waiting room- the confederate always appeared last, in order to render his role 
as real participant more credible- they were welcomed by an assistant and given a 
questionnaire, containing all personality variables (RWA, SDO, BIG-5).  
After having completed the questionnaire, they were led into the testing room, where the 
experimenter was already sitting at his table. After the experimenter welcomed the participant 
and the confederate, the assistant seemingly allotted the roles to the two participants by letting 
them choose between two pellets of paper that each had a letter written on them. However, 
whichever letter the real participant drew -“A” or “B”- he or she was always assigned to the 
role of the ‘accountant’, while the confederate was always assigned to solve the mental 
arithmetic tasks.  
Once the roles were assigned, the assistant explained that the purpose of the experiment was 
to examine the effect of gratification on performance. Hence, the confederate was asked to 
perform mental arithmetic tasks-19 in total- and the participant was asked to administer the 
money for each correct answer. The participant and the confederate were then seated 
according to their roles.  
After asking the participants to carefully read the instructions, the assistant left the room. The 
experimenter then asked the participant and the confederate whether they had understood their 
instructions, and finally, if both affirmed, whether they both could state again and with their 
own words what their role and obligations in the experiment were. Thus, the participant 
explicitly repeated that gratifications will be paid by him for correct answers only. 
Beginning-phase. After that, the experiment itself started with two “warming- up” tasks. The 
confederate solved the “warming-up” as well as the first three questions correctly. Then, at 
the fourth task, a wrong answer was given. The ‘accountant’- without paying any money- 
proceeded to the next question, when suddenly the experimenter advised him to pay out the 
money and thereby created the first conflict, as described above. The following fifth, as well 
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as the seventh, eight and tenth question were too answered incorrectly, resulting in a conflict 
as well, since the experimenter was repeating his order after each incorrect answer.  
Second-phase: experimenter absent. After the tenth question, which at the same time was the 
fifth conflict situation, the experimenter’s cell-phone started to vibrate- the confederate 
secretly called him- and he left the room, telling the two participants to proceed with the 
experiment. In this phase, with the experimenter being physically absent, two more situations 
occurred, in which the confederate gave an incorrect answer- at question thirteen and fifteen. 
In these situations, the confederate then noted on the paper in front of him whether the 
participant was now acting according to the originally agreed upon instructions or if he or she 
followed the experimenter’s order, as described above. In this way, internalization of the 
authority’s order was assessed.  
Return-phase. After question sixteen, the experimenter returned. Then, at question seventeen 
there was one more incorrect answer given, and, consequently, one more conflict arising, as 
the experimenter repeated his demand (if still necessary).  
End-phase. Finally, at question eighteen and nineteen, the confederate refused to show any 
kind of effort whatsoever to solve the tasks- noting that he was tired of doing math-, and with 
that denied any answer. The experimenter, however, still ordered the ‘accountant’ to pay the 
defined amount of money, despite the lack of the slightest effort. At this point, the amount of 
money, which had to be paid out for each task and that increased from one task to another, 
had reached its peak.  
The following Figure 3 illustrates the experiment further.  
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Figure 3. Phases of experiment with different modes of disbursement. Conflicts arise at the 
circled items.  
As described, within the total amount of 19 items- representing the 19 different task the 
confederate was suppose to solve-, the four different phases can be identified. As illustrated, 
the beginning- phase is the longest. This is because we designed the phase in a way that could 
allow the participant to ‘learn’ the deviant behavior. Thus, five conflicts arose in this phase, 
because this would give the participant enough opportunities to rationalize the act, and 
reframe it as acceptable, which, subsequently, should lead to its internalization. Again, it is 
important to note that during the second-phase, the experimenter was physically absent, 
because here internalization was assessed, as described above. The return-phase, where the 
experimenter reappears after the second-phase, as well as the end-phase, where the 
confederate denies any effort and answer is also illustrated. Generally, the items, where 
conflict situations emerged for every participant, are circled. Finally, as mentioned, 
throughout the experiment, the amount of money which had to be paid out for correct answers 
increased constantly, whereby the different modes of disbursements- linear and exponential- 
are plotted. Again, it is illustrated that in the beginning-phase, the amounts of money are 
higher in the linear condition, while, in the return- and end-phase, they are higher for the 
exponential condition. However, the sum of the disbursed amounts is relatively equal, with 
400 Euros for the exponential, and 418 for the linear mode. 
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Results 
Descriptive 
Termination. In general, 13 participants (14.8 %) terminated the experiment, while 75 (85.2 
%) participants obeyed the authority’s demand throughout the experiment. From the total of 
68 female participants, 10 participants terminated the experiment (14.7%). From the total of 
20 male participants, 3 participants terminated the experiment (15%).  
Internalization. Moreover, within the group of participants who didn’t terminate the 
experiment, 38 participants (50.6 %) internalized the demand in the second-phase, by 
performing the act even when the experimenter was physically absent. 26 of the participants 
who internalized were female (68.4%), while twelve were male (31.6%). This means that 
from the total of 68 female participants that participated in the experiment, 38.2% internalized 
the demand, while from the total of 20 male participants, 60% internalized. 73.7 % of 
participants who internalized were 23 years old or younger, while the other 26.3 % were 
between 24 and 31 years old.  
Accordingly, within the group of participants who didn’t terminate the experiment, 37 
participants (49.4 %) did not internalize the demand, but instead rejected it as soon as the 
experimenter was absent, and acted according to the originally established instructions. 32 of 
participants who didn’t internalize were female (86.5%), while five participants were male 
(13.5%). This means that from the total of 68 female participants, 47% did not internalize the 
demand, while from the total of 20 male participants, 25 % did not internalize. 83.8 % of 
these participants were 23 years old or younger, while the other 16.2 % were between 24 and 
42 years old. 
Results of Hypothesis Testing 
H1.1 The average amount of protest will directly decrease during the experiment for 
participants who internalize the demand. 
In order to test the hypothesis regarding the average amount of verbal protest in the different 
conflicts, a repeated-measurement ANOVA was computed. The dependent variable was the 
average amount of protest in a conflict and the independent variables were the different 
conflicts. The average amount of protest was calculated for each conflict by summarizing the 
amount of protest from each participant and dividing it by the number of these participants. 
Only the eight conflicts from the beginning-, return- and end-phase were considered, because, 
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as mentioned above, in the second phase, used to assess internalization, there is no verbal 
protest due to the absence of the experimenter.  
As expected, the results show a significant difference in the average amount of protest 
between the conflicts, F (2.88, 106.87) = 27.80, p.< .01. Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicate 
that assumptions have been violated χ2 (27) = 149.332, p.< .01, therefore multivariate tests are 
reported (ε=.41). The results show that the strength of protest was significantly affected by the 
type of conflict, V= 0.79, F (7. 31) = 16.97, p.<. 01, which confirms that the amount of protest 
varies significantly between at least two or more conflicts.  
Contrasts were computed in order to specify the differences between the amounts of protest in 
the different conflicts for participants who internalized. As expected, contrasts reveal that 
verbal protest was lower in the second conflict, than in the first conflict, F (1) = 28.10, p.< 
.01. There was no significant difference in the amount of verbal protest for participants who 
internalize between third and second conflict, F (1) = 0.39, p.> .05, between fourth and third 
conflict, F (1) = 2.69, p.> .05., as well as between conflict five and conflict four, F (1) = 0.00, 
p.> .05. The average strength of protest then was significantly lower in conflict six than in 
conflict five, F (1) = 7.49, p.< .01. No significant difference was found between conflict seven 
and six, F (1) = 4.07, p.> .05, and finally, there was no significant difference in the amount of 
verbal protest between conflict eight and conflict seven, F(1) = 3.78, p.< .05. Results therefore 
indicate that the average amount of protest directly decreased throughout the experiment.  
H1.2 The average amount of protest will not directly decrease during the experiment for 
participants who do not internalize. 
Analogical to H1.1 we computed another repeated- measurement ANOVA for participants 
who did not internalize the demand and therefore did not perform the demanded act when the 
experimenter was physically absent but acted in accordance with the originally established 
rules of the instruction. The unexpected result shows a significant difference in the average 
amount of protest between the phases, F (4.27, 153.56) = 6.36, p.< .01. Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity indicate that assumptions have been violated χ2 (27) = 183.97, p.< .01, therefore 
multivariate tests are reported (ε=.61). The results show that the strength of verbal protest was 
significantly affected by the type of phase, V= 0.54, F (7. 30) = 5.01, p.< .01, which confirms 
that the amount of protest varies significantly between at least two or more conflicts. 
Even though the overall ANOVA- contrary to our assumption- suggests that there was a 
difference between the amounts of verbal protest in the different conflicts, the contrasts that 
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were computed in order to specify the differences between the conflicts for participants who 
did not internalize, relativize this finding. Contrasts reveal that verbal protest was 
significantly lower in the second conflict than in the first conflict, F (1) = 4.69, p.< .05. 
However, there was no significant difference in the amount of verbal protest between third 
and second conflict, F (1) = 0.05, p.> .05, between fourth and third conflict, F (1) = 2.69, p.> 
.05, between conflict five and conflict four, F (1) = 3.17, p.> .05, conflict six and conflict five 
F (1) = 3.17, p.> .05, conflict seven and conflict six, F (1) = 1.00, p.> .05, and finally between 
conflict eight and conflict seven, F(1) = 1.84, p.> .05. This means, that the amount of protest 
did not decrease throughout the entire experiment, as it was the case within the group of 
participants who internalized, but that it only decreased at the very beginning.  
H1.3 The average amount of protest during the beginning-phase, as well as the return-
and end-phase will be lower for participants who internalize than for participants who 
don’t internalize the demand.  
To test this assumption, independent t-tests were computed, with the average amount of 
protest for every specific phase as dependent variable and the two groups of participants as 
independent variable. The average amount of protest for each phase was calculated by 
summarizing the amount of protest for each conflict in a specific phase and dividing it by the 
number of occurring conflicts in that phase.  
As expected, results show that on average, participants who internalized the authority’s 
demand expressed less verbal protest in the conflicts of the beginning-phase, prior to the 
second-phase (M= 0.73, SE= 0.39). Accordingly, participants who didn’t internalize 
expressed more protest in this phase (M= .09, SE= 0.32). This difference between the two 
groups of participants was significant, t (71.01) = -4.37, p< 0.1.  
Moreover, another independent t-test was computed for the return-phase. As expected, results 
show that on average, participants who internalized the authority’s demand expressed less 
verbal protest in the conflict of the return-phase, after the second-phase (M= 0.18, SE= 0.39). 
Participants who didn’t internalize therefore expressed more protest in the return-phase. (M= 
1.03; SE= 0, 44). The difference between the two groups of participants again was significant, 
t (73) = -8.78, p< 0.1. 
Finally, an independent t-test was computed for the end-phase. As expected, results show that 
on average, participants who internalized the authority’s demand expressed less verbal protest 
in the end-phase. (M= 0.25, SE= 0.45). Participants who didn’t internalize therefore expressed 
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more protest in the return-phase. (M= 0.96; SE= 0,30). The difference between the two groups 
of participants was significant, t (64.64) = -8.12, p< 0.1. Results from H1.1, H2.1 and H1.3 
are illustrated in Table 1 and Figure 4. 
Table 1. Means and Std. Deviation of amounts of protest for participants who did not 
terminate (without conflicts of the second-phase).
a 
Significant Difference between participants 
who internalized and didn’t internalize. b Significant Difference between male and female 
participants. Protest ranges between 0 and 4. (Significance level was alpha < .5). 
 
 Mean (Std. Deviation) 
 Internalized Not Internalized 
Conflict Nr. 
Total (N38) Male (n12) 
Female 
(n26) Total (N37) Male (n5) Female (n32) 
Item 4 1.63 (0.85) 1.92 (0.90) 1.50 (0.81) 1.38 (0.55) 1.60 (0.55) 1.34 (0.55) 
Item 5 0.63a (0.59) 0.58 (0.51) 0.65 (0.63) 1.14a (0.59) 1.20 (0.45) 1.13 (0.61) 
Item 7 0.58a (0.68) 0.42 (0.51) 0.65 (0.75) 1.11a (0.61) 1.20 (0.45) 1.09 (0.64) 
Item 8 0.39a (0.64) 0.17 (0.39) 0.50 (0.71) 0.95a (0.41) 0.80 (0.45) 0.97 (0.40) 
 Item 10 0.39a (0.60) 0.33 (0.65) 0.42 (0.58) 0.86a (0.35) 0.80 (0.45) 0.87 (0.34) 
Beginning- 
Phase  
0.72a (0.62) 0.69 (0.59) 0.74 (0.70) 1.9a (0.50) 1.12 (0.47) 1.07 (0.51) 
Item 17 0.18a (0.39) 0.00b (0.00) 0.27b (0.45) 1.03a (0.44) 1.00 (0.00) 1.03 (0.47) 
Return- 
Phase  
0.18a (0.39) 0.00b (0.00) 0.27b (0.45) 1.03a (0.44) 1.00 (0.00) 1.03 (0.47) 
Item 18 0.37a (0.75) 0.25b (0.45) 0.42b (0.86) 1.00a (0.41) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.44) 
Item 19 0.13a (0.34) 0.00b (0.00) 0.19b (0.40) 0.92a (0.28) 1.00 (0.00) 0.91 (0.30) 
End-Phase  0.25a (0.55) 0.13b (0.23) 0.31b (0.63) 0.96a (0.35) 1.00 (0.00) 0.96 (0.37) 
 
 
 
 42 
 
Figure 4. Average amount of protest per conflict for participants who internalized and didn’t 
internalize, from “0” (unsolicited performance of act) to “4” (order has to be repeated four 
times before it is obeyed). During the second-phase, the experimenter is absent and no protest 
is assessed. Conflicts occur at the circled items. * Significant Difference between participants 
who internalized and didn’t internalize. 
Discussion 
As result from H1.1 and H1.2 show, if participants are separated into two groups according to 
the criteria of internalization two different patterns emerge, implying two different modes of 
dissonance reduction. 
If we look at the group of participants who internalized the authority’s demand in the second-
phase (item 11 to item 15) in Figure 4, there was a gradual decrease over the course of the 
experiment in three steps. First, the average protest in the first conflict (item four) was higher 
than during the rest of the experiment. Secondly, the average protest in the remaining 
conflicts of the beginning-phase (item five, seven, eight and ten) was higher than in the 
conflicts of the return- and end-phase (item 17, 18 and 19), and finally, this means that the 
average protest in the return-and end-phase was the lowest in the experiment. Hence, there 
was a decrease of resistance against the demanded act in the face of increasing severity. 
Paradoxically, at the point in the experiment where severity of the demanded act had reached 
its peak, resistance against the act was at its low. The increase in the ease therefore is 
absolute, meaning that the average amount of protest decreased directly throughout the 
experiment. In the end, participants were willing to comply to the demand even when there 
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was no effort whatsoever to solve the task by the confederate, and the amount of money was 
highest. The escalation of behavior, defined as an increase in ease, severity and pervasiveness, 
was thus found in this group of participants.  
Accordingly, in the beginning-phase, it can be seen in Figure 4 that while average protest in 
the first conflict (item four) was equally high for both groups of participants, participants who 
internalized the demand in the second-phase showed a stronger decrease of protest during the 
conflicts of the beginning phase (item 1 to 10). Therefore, in this group, starting from the 
second conflict (item 5), the average amount of protest was decreasing towards ‘0’, indicating 
that an increasing amount of participants were not protesting at all, but instead were 
performing the demanded act without the demand itself having to be repeated. Consequently, 
the average protest was lower throughout the entire experiment for this group of participants 
who internalized, compared to the group of participants who didn’t internalize. 
The patterns of protest within this group indicate that they were indeed rationalizing and 
therefore justifying the act in order to reduce dissonance. Due to this rationalization of 
behavior in the beginning-phase, the act was rendered psychologically more acceptable, as the 
decreasing amount of average protest indicates. In addition, results indicate that due to this 
acceptance they decided to perform the act in the second-phase, even when it was not directly 
ordered. Thus, due to the higher acceptance of the act, stemming from rationalization, they 
internalized the act. After having performed the act even when the experimenter was absent 
(second-phase) the act was also performed in the return- and end-phase (item 16 till19), as 
severity of the act further increased, and no effort was shown by the confederate to solve the 
arithmetic tasks. Moreover, after internalizing the act, resistance was now even lower in these 
phases, as prior to the internalization.  
On the other hand, the protest expressed within the group of participants who didn’t 
internalize the demand in the second-phase, did not significantly differ during the experiment- 
with the exception of higher protest at the first conflict (item 4). It therefore can be concluded 
from these results that within this group of participants, processes of rationalization did not 
occur because the constant amount of openly demonstrated protest in the beginning-phase 
indicates that the psychological acceptance of the demanded act did not increase, as this 
would have led to lower amounts of protest. This can also explain why participants within this 
group decided not to internalize the demand, but to act according to the originally established 
rules, as soon as the experimenter was physically absent. Consequently, because no 
rationalization was used, and thus, the act was not internalized, the average amount of protest 
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did not decrease in the face of increasing severity in the return- and end-phase. Therefore, the 
effect of a gradually –and directly- decreasing resistance in the face of increasing severity 
throughout the experiment was not found in this group. As a result, these participants behaved 
obediently and performed the act only when they were explicitly told to do so, but refused to 
psychologically accept the act, as they refused to internalize it. 
As assumed, this means that there still was an increase in the ease of the act, but rather than 
being absolute, it is a relative increase: While the protest on average remains the same, the 
severity of the act is constantly increasing. 
As we argue, these results indicate that within this group of participants dissonance was not 
reduced by rationalization, but that instead dissonance was to some extent alleviated by 
exhibiting a behavior that was consistent with the self-concept and thus reduced the perceived 
inconsistency between behavior and self-expectancies. As we have seen, throughout the 
experiment this group of participants expressed a constant amount of resistance against the 
demanded act- on average, by refusing to perform the act without being explicitly told to do 
so. Therefore, we assume that they were able to reduce dissonance without engaging in 
rationalization that would have led to higher acceptance of the act and consequently to 
decreasing amounts of protest, as we have seen. Instead, results indicate that resistance itself- 
even as subtle as this- indeed served as a consistent cognition, which was added as a 
consistent cognition to the discrepancy between behavior and self-concept and thereby 
reduced the perceived inconsistency.  
H2.1 The average amount of protest for participants who internalize will be lower in the 
beginning-phase of the experiment when there is a linear mode of disbursement. 
To test this assumption, an independent t-test was computed with the average amount of 
protest in the beginning-phase as dependent and the disbursement modes as independent 
variable. The average amount of protest for the beginning-phase was calculated by 
summarizing the amount of protest from each conflict in this phase and dividing it by the 
number of conflicts arising. As expected, results show that on average, participants who 
internalized the authority’s demand expressed less verbal protest in the conflicts of the 
beginning-phase when there was a linear mode of disbursement (M= 0.53, SE= 0.37). 
Accordingly, participants who internalized expressed more protest in this phase when there 
was an exponential mode of disbursement (M=0.90, SE=0.33). This difference between the 
two modes of disbursement was significant, t (36) = -3.24, p< 0.1.  
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H2.2 The average amount of protest for participants who do not internalize will not 
differ significantly in the beginning-phase between the exponential mode and linear 
mode of disbursement. 
To test this assumption, an independent t-test was computed with the average amount of 
protest in the beginning-phase as dependent and the mode of disbursement as independent 
variable. Again, the average amount of protest for the beginning-phase was calculated by 
summarizing the amount of protest from each conflict in this phase and dividing it by the 
number of conflicts arising. Results show that on average, participants who did not internalize 
the authority’s demand expressed less verbal protest in the conflicts of the beginning-phase, 
prior to the second-phase, when there was a linear mode of disbursement (M= 1.07, SE= 
0.34). Participants who internalized, on average, expressed more protest in this phase when 
there was an exponential mode of disbursement (M= 1.11, SE= 0.31). However, as expected, 
this difference between the two modes of disbursement was not significant, t (35) = -3.34, p> 
0.5.  
H2.3 The average amount of protest for participants who internalize will be lower in the 
end-phase of the experiment when there is an exponential mode of disbursement. 
Analogically to H1.1.1, to test this assumption, an independent t-test was computed with the 
average amount of protest in the end-phase as dependent and the disbursement mode as 
independent variable. The average amount of protest for the end-phase was calculated by 
summarizing the amount of protest from each conflict in this phase and dividing it by the 
number of conflicts arising. The results show that on average, participants who internalized 
the authority’s demand expressed less protest in the conflicts of the end-phase when there was 
an exponential mode of disbursement (M= 0.23, SE= 0.38), whereas participants who 
internalized expressed more protest in this phase when there was a linear mode of 
disbursement (M= 0.28, SE= 0.52). However, contrary to the prediction, this difference 
between the two modes of disbursement was not significant, t (36) = 0.360, p> 0.5.  
H2.4 The average amount of protest for participants who do not internalize will not 
differ significantly in the end-phase between the exponential mode and linear mode of 
disbursement. 
Analogically to H2.1.1, an independent t-test was computed with the average amount of 
protest in the end-phase as dependent and the mode of disbursement as independent variable. 
Results show that on average, participants who did not internalize the authority’s demand 
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expressed less verbal protest in the conflicts of the end-phase when there was an exponential 
mode of disbursement (M= 0.94, SE= 0.24). Participants who didn’t internalize, on average, 
expressed more protest in this phase when there was a linear mode of disbursement (M= 0.98, 
SE= 0.34). However, as expected, this difference between the two modes of disbursement was 
not significant, t (35) = 0.34, p> 0.5.Results from H1.1.1, H1.2.1 as well as H1.1.2 and H1.2.2 
are illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 4. 
Table 2. Means and Std. Deviation of amount of protest for participants who internalized and 
didn’t internalize, for conflicts and phases (without second-phase) of the different modes of 
disbursement. 
a
Significant difference between linear and exponential mode of disbursement. 
b
Significant Difference between male and female participants within one mode of 
disbursement. Protest ranges from “0” to “4”. (Significance level was alpha < .5). 
 Linear Mode of Disbursement (N 38) Exponential Mode of Disbursement (N 37) 
 Mean (Std. Devition) Mean (Std. Deviation) 
 Internalized Not Internalized Internalized Not Internalized 
Conflict Total 
(n18) 
Male 
(n7) 
Female 
(n11) 
Total 
(n20) 
Male 
(n3) 
Female 
(n17) 
Total 
(n20) 
Male 
(n5) 
Female 
(n15) 
Total 
(n17) 
Male 
(n2) 
Female 
(n15) 
Item 4 1.50 
(0.79) 
1.57 
(0.79) 
1.45 
(0.82) 
1.45 
(0.61) 
1.67 
(0.58) 
1.41 
(0.62) 
1.75 
(0.91) 
2.40 
(0.89) 
1.53 
(0.83) 
1.29 
(0.47) 
1.50 
(0.71) 
1.27 
(0.46) 
Item 5 0.39
a 
(0.61) 
0.43 
(0.54) 
0.36 
(0.67) 
1.15 
(0.59) 
1.33 
(0.58) 
1.12 
(0.60) 
0.85a 
(0.49) 
0.80 
(0.45) 
0.87 
(0.52) 
1.12 
(0.60) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
1.13 
(0.64) 
Item 7 0.33
a 
(0.49) 
0.43 
(0.54) 
0.27 
(0.47) 
1.10 
(0.64) 
1.33 
(0.58) 
1.06 
(0.66) 
0.80a 
(0.77) 
0.40 
(0.55) 
0.93 
(0.80) 
1.12 
(0.60) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
1.13 
(0.64) 
Item 8 0.22 
(0.43) 
0.29 
(0.49) 
0.18 
(0.41) 
0.85 
(0.37) 
0.67 
(0.58) 
0.88 
(0.33) 
0.55 
(0.76) 
0.00b 
(0.00) 
0.73b 
(0.80) 
1.10 
(0.43) 
1.09 
(0.00) 
1.07 
(0.46) 
Item 10 
0.22a 
(0.43) 
0.29 
(0.49) 
0.18 
(0.41) 
0.80 
(0.41) 
0.67 
(0.58) 
0.82 
(0.39) 
0.55a 
(0.69) 
0.40 
(0.89) 
0.60 
(0.63) 
0.94 
(0.24) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
Beginning- 
Phase  
0.53a 
(0.55) 
0.60 
(0.57) 
0.49 
(0.56) 
1.1 
(0.52) 
1.13 
(0.58) 
1.06 
(0.52) 
0.90a 
(0.72) 
0.80 
(0.56) 
0.93 
(0.72) 
1.1 
(0.52) 
1.1 
(0.14) 
1.11 
(0.49) 
Item 17 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.41) 
1.10 
(0.55) 
1.00 
(0.009 
1.12 
(0.60) 
0.25 
(0.44) 
0.00b 
(0.00) 
0.33b 
(0.49) 
0.94 
(0.24) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
Return- 
Phase  
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.41) 
1.10 
(0.55) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
1.12 
(0.60) 
0.25 
(0.44) 
0.00b 
(0.00) 
0.33b 
(0.49) 
0.94 
(0.24) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
Item 18 0.44 
(0.98) 
0.43 
(0.54) 
0.45 
(1.21) 
1.05 
(0.51) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
1.06 
(0.56) 
0.30 
(0.47) 
0.00b 
(0.00) 
0.40b 
(0.51) 
0.94 
(0.24) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
Item 19 0.11 
(0.32) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.41) 
0.90 
(0.31) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.88 
(0.33) 
0.15 
(0.37) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.41) 
0.94 
(0.24) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
End-Phase  0.28 
(0.65) 
0.22 
(0.27) 
0.32 
(0.81) 
0.98 
(0.41) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.97 
(0.45) 
0.23 
(0.51) 
0.00b 
(0.00) 
0.30b 
(0.46) 
1.00 
(0.24) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
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Figure 5. Average amount of protest for beginning- and end-phase for participants who 
internalized and participants who didn’t internalize in the different modes of disbursement. 
Discussion 
Regarding the modes of disbursement, results too indicate that rationalization processes were 
used in order to reduce dissonance within the group of participants who internalized. If we 
look at the groups of “Linear/Internalized” and “Exponential/Internalized” in Figure 5, as 
predicted, results show that the higher severity of the act in the linear mode during the 
beginning-phase consequently led to lower amounts of protest for participants who 
internalized. This means that participants who internalized expressed less protest during the 
beginning-phase when they were in the linear condition, instead of the exponential condition. 
This result indicates that psychological acceptance of the act paradoxically increased with its 
severity. While the amount of money that had to be disbursed during the beginning-phase was 
higher in the linear condition, the amount of protest was lower. This confirms our 
assumptions, as it can be explained by stronger rationalization, which is evoked by higher 
severity of the act, which causes greater dissonance. Hence, this result indicates that the 
perceived dissonance increases as the inconsistent act becomes more severe. This is the case 
because, as the inconsistent act becomes more severe, the discrepancy between behavior and 
self-concept increases. Furthermore, the fact that there was no significant difference in the 
end-phase between “Linear/Internalized” and “Exponential/Internalized” might be explained 
by the generally low amount of protest, which was already so low, that the relatively small 
distinctions did not reach significance. The average amount of protest for the beginning-phase 
and especially for the end-phase indicate that an increasing amount of participants who 
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internalized performed the act without an explicit and direct order to do so by the authority 
figure. Interestingly, the decrease of resistance against the act is strongest in the 
“Exponential/Internalized” group. Here, the act is initially less severe than in the linear 
disbursement mode and, during the return- and end-phase, more severe than in the linear 
mode. This indicates that the escalation effect is stronger, when the initial act is less severe 
and severity increases exponentially. Moreover, as Table 2 shows, the escalating effect in the 
exponential mode is stronger for male than for female participants, because their resistance 
against the act decreases more strongly and also more rapidly.  
Accordingly, within the group of participants who didn’t internalize, no significant decrease 
in the amount of protest was found between modes of disbursement. If we look at the groups 
of “Linear/Not Internalized” and “Exponential/ Not Internalized” in Figure 5, it can be seen 
that the average amount of protest for participants who didn’t internalize was equally high in 
the linear and the exponential condition during the beginning phase, as well as during the end-
phase. This indicates that in this group of participants, rationalization processes were not used 
to reduce dissonance, because the amount of protest did not decrease in the face of higher 
severity in the linear mode, as it did for participants who internalized. Accordingly, there is no 
significant difference in the average amount of protest between the beginning-phase and the 
end-phase for the groups of “Linear/Not Internalized” and “Exponential/Not Internalized”, as 
the amount of protest remains relatively constant at “1”, as Figure 5 shows. Again, this 
indicates that participants who didn’t internalize refused to accept the inconsistent act and the 
authority figure had to explicitly and directly order it, before it was performed.  
H3 Participants who internalize are calmer, more placid, satisfied, relaxed and less 
interested than participants who don’t internalize.   
To test this assumption, a t-test was computed for each affectivity state- which participants 
had reported on a 7-point scale- as dependent variable, and the two groups of participants as 
independent variables. 
On average, participants who internalized felt calmer and less agitated (M= 4.34, SE= 1.58) 
than participants who didn’t internalize (M= 4.27, SE= 1.71). Contrary to the assumption, this 
difference was not significant t (73) = 1.09.  
On average, participants who internalized felt more placid and less nervous (M= 4.92, SE= 
1.44) than participants who didn’t internalize (M= 4.42, SE= 1.48). Contrary to our 
assumptions, this difference was not significant t (72) = 1.49.  
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On average, participants who internalized felt more satisfied and less unsatisfied (M= 5.21, 
SE= 1.51) than participants who didn’t internalize (M= 4.59, SE= 1.55). As expected, this 
difference was significant t (73) = 1.74.  
On average, participants who internalized felt more relaxed and less tens (M= 4.74, SE= 1.92) 
than participants who didn’t internalize (M= 4.27, SE= 1.71). Contrary to our assumptions, 
this difference was not significant t (73) = 1.11.  
On average, participants who internalized felt less interested and more bored (M= 5.05, SE= 
1.45) than participants who didn’t internalize (M= 5.35, SE= 1.21). Contrary to our 
assumptions, this difference was not significant t (73) = -.97. Results are illustrated in Table 
3. 
Table 3. Affectivity- scores for male and female participants who didn’t terminate. 
a
Significant difference between participants who internalized and who didn’t internalize. 
b
Significant difference between male and female participants within one condition. The score 
ranges between “1” and “7”. (Significance level was alpha < .5). 
  Mean (Std. Deviation) 
 Internalized Not Internalized 
Affect 
(1-7) 
Total 
(N38) Male (n12) Female (n26) Total (N36) Male (n5) Female (n31) 
Agitated vs. 
Calm 
4.34 (1.58) 4.58 (2.11) 4.23 (1.31) 4.27 (1.71) 3.40 (1.34) 4.10 (1.58) 
Nervous vs. 
Placid 
492 (1.44) 5.42 (1.51) 4.69 (1.38) 4.35 (1.51) 4.40 (1.95) 4.42 (1.43) 
Unsatisfied vs. 
Satisfied 
5.21a (1.51) 5.58 (1.24) 5.04 (1.61) 4.59a (1.55) 3.40 (1.52) 4.81 (1.51) 
Tens  
vs. 
Relaxed 
4.74 (1.92) 5.50 (2.00) 4.38 (1.81) 4.27 (1.71) 3.80 (2.49) 4.42 (1.56) 
Bored  
vs. 
Interessted 
5.05 (1.29) 5.75b (1.29) 4.73b (1.43) 5.35 (1.21) 4.80 (1.64) 5.42 (1.15) 
 
Discussion 
The affectivity scores for both groups support the assumptions that rationalization processes 
were underlying the effect of escalation, as it was found in the group of participants who 
internalized, because, as predicted, these participants expressed a more positive affectivity 
after the experiment than did participants who didn’t internalize, by stating that they felt more 
satisfied. As we argue, satisfaction is an indicator for the cognitive evaluation of the own 
behavior. Thus, since participant who internalized the demand, and who behaved most 
obediently throughout the experiment, stated that they were more satisfied with their 
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behavior, it can be concluded that they perceived less cognitive dissonance. This indicates that 
they rationalized their behavior, and reframed it as acceptable, which supports our assumption 
that rationalization lead to higher psychological acceptance of the demanded act, and, 
consequently, to a more positive cognitive evaluation after the experiment.  
H4.1: Terminations of the experiment occur more often in the beginning-phase than in 
the later phases.  
In order to test the assumption a chi-square test was computed. As expected, there was a 
significant association between the phase of experiment and whether or not participants would 
terminate. χ2 (2) = 88.00, p< .001. Results show that there were more terminations in the 
beginning-phase of the experiment. Figure 6 illustrates this finding. 
 
 
Figure 6. Absolute amount of terminations per item. Circled items mark the conflict 
situations. 
H4.2: There is no difference in termination rate between modes of disbursement. 
In order to test this assumption, a χ2test was computed. As expected, results show that there is 
no significant relation between mode of disbursement and number of terminations, χ2 (1) = 
.09, p> .05. Hence, the mode of disbursement had no effect on terminations. 
H4.3: Participants who terminate the experiment, on average express more protest than 
participants who internalize and participants who don’t internalize.  
To test this assumption, an ANOVA was computed, with the average amount of protest per 
conflict as dependent variable and the three groups of participants as independent variable. As 
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expected, there was a significant difference in the average amount of protest between the three 
groups of participants, F (15.45) = 183.15, p.< .001. Results show that there was a significant 
quadratic trend, F (1, 85) = 196.07, p.< .001, indicating that from one group to the next 
(internalized- not internalized- terminated) the average amount of protest increased 
curvilinear. As expected, planned contrast revealed that participants who terminated the 
experiment expressed significantly more protest than participants who did not terminate, t 
(11.50) = -26.69, p.< .001. Figure 2.7 illustrates these findings. 
 
Figure 7. Average amount of protest in a conflict per person for the three different groups of 
participants. 
H4.4 Participants who internalize are calmer, more placid, satisfied, relaxed and less 
interested than participants who terminate the experiment.   
To test this assumption, a t-test was computed for each reported affectivity state as dependent 
variable, and the two groups of participants as independent variables. 
On average, participants who internalized felt calmer (M= 4.34, SE= 1.58) than participants 
who terminated (M= 2.92, SE= .79). As expected, this difference was significant t (38.12) = 
4.15.  
On average, participants who internalized felt more placid (M= 4.92, SE= 1.44) than 
participants who terminated (M= 3.75, SE= 1.49). As expected, this difference was significant 
t (48) = 2.44.  
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On average, participants who internalized, contrary to our prediction, felt less satisfied (M= 
5.21, SE= 1.51) than participants who terminated (M= 5.42, SE= 1.56)., However, this 
difference was not significant t (48) = -.41  
On average, participants who internalized felt more relaxed (M= 4.74, SE= 1.92) than 
participants who terminated (M= 3.69, SE= 1.37). As expected, this difference was significant 
t (26)= 2.12.  
On average, participants who internalized felt less interested (M= 5.05, SE= 1.45) than 
participants who terminated (M= 6.17, SE= .58). As expected, this difference was significant t 
(45.19)= -3.86.  
Discussion 
Results match the prediction that participants, who disobeyed the authority in the true sense of 
the word by terminating the experiment, refused to rationalize or justify the demanded act at 
all. Accordingly, termination rates were independent from modes of disbursement. Together 
with the high amounts of average protest, shown in Figure 7, this indicates that the act itself, 
independently from its severity, was psychologically unacceptable to an extent, which evoked 
the amount of protest necessary to terminate the experiment. Therefore, participants refused to 
perform the inconsistent behavior and engaged more strongly in the external instead of the 
internal conflict. Consequently, as Figure 6 illustrates, twelve of thirteen terminations 
occurred in the beginning-phase of the experiment. However, it seems that even for 
participants who decided to strongly engage in the external conflict with the authority figure, 
disobeying the authority’s demand is a rather discomforting behavior. The reported affectivity 
states that after the experiment, they felt less placid, less relaxed, less calm, but also more 
interested than participants who rationalized the act. This result indicates that obedience to an 
authority figure is indeed a societal norm and that its violation causes dissonance to some 
extent. 
H5.1: There is a negative association between protest and RWA-score 
In order to test this assumption Spearman’s correlation coefficient was assessed. No 
significant relationship between the amount of protest and RWA was found, rs = -.215, p< .05. 
If we look at the two subscales of the RWA, there is no significant relationship between 
authoritarian submission and the amount of protest, rs = -.235, p> .05, as well as no significant 
relationship between conservatism and the amount of protest, rs = -.125, p > .05.  
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H5.2 There is a negative association between protest and SDO-score 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient was assessed and revealed that there was no significant 
relationship between the amount of protest and SDO-score, rs = .013, p > .05. 
H5.3 There is a negative association between protest and conscientiousness 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient was assessed and revealed that there was no significant 
relationship between the amount of protest and conscientiousness, rs = -.140, p > .05. 
H5.4 There is a positive relationship between protest and neuroticism 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient was assessed and revealed that there was no significant 
relationship between the amount of protest and neuroticism, rs = .096 p > .05. 
H5.5. There is a positive relationship between protest and openness. 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient was assessed and revealed that there was no significant 
relationship between the amount of protest and openness, rs = .057, p > .05. 
H5.6 There is a positive relationship between the amount of protest and extraversion. 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient was assessed and revealed that there was no significant 
relationship between the amount of protest and extraversion, rs = -.153, p > .05. 
H5.7 There is a negative relationship between the amount of protest and agreeableness. 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient was assessed and revealed that there was no significant 
relationship between the amount of protest and agreeableness, rs = -.045, p > .05. 
Table 4 illustrates the results from H5.  
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Table 4. Correlation between personality traits and the average amount of protest. 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
N= 88 
Average 
Protest 
Authoritarian 
Submission 
Conser-
vatism 
RWA 
(total) SDO 
Conscien- 
tiousness 
Neuro- 
ticism 
Open- 
ness 
Extra- 
version 
Aggree- 
ableness 
Average 
Protest 
1 -.235* -.125 -.215* .013 -1.40 .096 .057 -.153 -.045 
Authoritarian 
Submission 
-.235* 1 .232* .842** .488** .201 -.091 -.295** .112 -.019 
Conservatism -125 .232* 1 .699** .433* .170 .145 -.315* -.126 -.181 
RWA (total) -.215* .842** .699** 1 .598** .194 .012 -.375** .024 -.131 
SDO 0.13 .488** .433** .598** 1 .035 -.069 -.112 -.012 -.201 
Conscientious
ness 
-.140 .201 .170 .194 0.35 1 .002 -.094 .019 .288* 
Neuroticism .096 -.091 .145 .012 -.069 .002 1 -.399** -.072 -.283** 
Openness .057 -.295* -.315* -.375** -.112 -.094 -.399** 1 .197 .185 
Extraversion -.153 .112 -.126 .024 -.012 .019 -.072 .197 1 .300** 
Aggreableness -.045 -.019 -.181 -.131 -.201 .288* -.283** .185 .300** 1 
 
Discussion 
As results from H5 show, none of the Big-Five personality traits was associated with the 
average amount of protest. Thus, obedience in the experimental situation was not influenced 
by these personality traits. However, there was a moderate association between the average 
amount of protest and RWA- score, as well as a moderate association between the average 
protest and the tendency to behave submissively to authority figures. No association was 
found between SDO or conservatism and average protest.  
In order to contribute to the understanding of these results, it might be helpful to look at the 
debate between situationists and personality psychologists, which lasted over four decades 
and circled around the core question of whether the situation or the personality was the more 
important factor for explaining behavior. Nowadays, there seems to be no doubt that both, 
situation and personality, need to be considered when behavior is explained. Most 
importantly, the interactions between these two factors have widely been acknowledged as 
relevant for human behavior (Burger, 2010). The different points of views from situationists 
and personality psychologist can be brought together, if two different levels of behavior 
analysis are considered. On an aggregated level, where behavior is assessed across a number 
of situations, personality differences between persons are a solid and powerful factor for the 
explanation of behavioral differences. Thus, personality traits are useful for explaining 
behavior on an average level. However, on a level where behavior is assessed in a single 
situation, personality traits are much less powerful for explaining behavior. This means that 
the within-person variability from one situation to another is determined more strongly by 
situational factors (Fleeson and Noftle, 2009). The debate was also concerned with the issue 
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of obedience to authority and the potentially negative consequences. While uncritical obedient 
behavior had been attributed to personality in the 1940s and 1950s, the power of the situation 
had been widely recognized after the experiments of Milgram, until, in the 70s, a person- by- 
situation interactions approach was adopted more strongly. In this regard, it has been found 
that personality traits become less important in so-called strong situations, which refer to 
“highly structured, role-governed situations that have clear norms or rules.” These 
”situations can and sometimes do overwhelm personality variables, even in well-intentioned 
and caring people.” (Benjamin Jr. and Simpson, 2009, p. 16). Undoubtedly, the situation in 
the present experiment was such a clearly structured, strong situation as the roles and the 
hierarchies of the actors were clearly defined for the experimenter and the participant. Thus, 
this might explain the relative lack of influence by personality traits and indicate once more 
that under certain circumstances ordinary individuals can be lead to engage in negative 
behavior, when they are instructed to do so (Burger, 2010). Consequently, regarding the 
situation within organizational corruption, the hierarchical structure that characterizes the 
relation between an individual and its supervisor, as well as the relation between a newcomer 
and his or her veteran co-worker, suggests that the obedient behavior, which leads the 
individual to perform the initial corrupt act, is likely to be more strongly determined by 
situational than by personality factors. (Brief, Buttram & Dukerich, 2001; Ashfort and Anand, 
2003). Nevertheless, as results indicate, the norm of obedience inherent in such a hierarchical 
relation between an authority figure and an individual seem to have a stronger influence on 
those who generally tend to behave submissively to authority figures.  
 
3. General Discussion 
In order to analyze the data from the experiment, participants were separated into three 
different groups: Participants who terminated the experiment, participants who didn’t 
internalize the authority’s demand, and participants who internalized the demand. By 
clustering participants in this way certain patterns in behavior emerged that shed some light 
on the process of escalation in behavior and its psychological groundwork.  
Within the group of participants who terminated the experiment, participants decided to 
engage strongly in the external conflict with the authority figure in order to reduce or avoid 
the internal one. The authority’s demand evoked an amount of protest, which almost 
immediately led to the experiment’s termination, as twelve of thirteen terminations occurred 
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during the beginning-phase. Accordingly, the average amount of protest is more than four 
times higher than in the other groups of participants. As results show, the amount of protest 
was negatively correlated with the construct of authoritarian submission, which means that 
participants who expressed higher amounts of protest generally stated a lower tendency to 
behave submissively to authority figures. As a consequence, the norm of behaving obediently 
towards an authority figure might have been less salient for these participants, and its 
violation arousing less dissonance. Thus, they were willing and capable to increase protest 
against the demanded act, up to the crucial point of termination. In general, the escalation, 
defined as a decrease of resistance in the face of increasing severity, was naturally not found 
in this group of participants. 
On the other hand, within the group of participants who didn’t terminate, differences emerged 
between participants who internalized and those who didn’t internalize. The overall difference 
between these two groups, besides internalization and non-internalization, was the pattern of 
average protest throughout the experiment regarding the average amount of protest and its 
decrease.  
Since results show that participants who didn’t internalize expressed a constant amount of 
protest, which did not directly decrease throughout the experiment, it can be concluded that 
these participants refused to increase the act’s psychological acceptance. Subsequently, within 
this group of participants, dissonance was not reduced by engaging in rationalization, as this 
would have rendered the act psychologically acceptable and lowered the amount of protest. 
The lower degree of psychological acceptance also explains why they decided not to 
internalize the demand in the second-phase, but instead decided to act in accordance with the 
originally established rules from the instruction.  
Instead of rationalizing the act, these participants on average continued to openly demonstrate 
their resistance throughout the experiment by refusing to perform the act without being 
explicitly ordered to do so. This, as we argued, functioned as a mode of dissonance reduction, 
because open resistance against the act- even as subtle as this-, served as a consistent 
cognition that reduced the perceived discrepancy between behavior and self-concept. Since 
the inconsistency was to some extent reduced by this consistent behavior, the magnitude of 
dissonance was too to some extent reduced. 
However, as mentioned above, participants who expressed a rather low amount of average 
protest, as it can be observed in this group, generally also expressed a higher tendency to 
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behave submissively to authority figures. Therefore, results indicate that this personality trait 
hindered them to increase their disobedience against the authority over a certain extent. This 
might have been the case, because the norm to behave obediently towards an authority figure 
was salient to them, and thus, the violation of this norm might have been more dissonance 
arousing than performing the demanded inconsistent act. Hence, the unwillingness or 
incapability of engaging more strongly in the external conflict due to the tendency of 
behaving submissively might have served as a ‘glass-ceiling’ of disobedience, because of 
which the evoked protest could not increase further.  
Furthermore, since the performed act was not rendered psychologically acceptable in this 
group but was still performed, these participants should have experienced more dissonance. 
Accordingly, they stated a less positive affectivity after the experiment. They felt less satisfied 
after the experiment than participants who internalized. This means that they cognitively 
evaluated their behavior less positively than participants who internalized the demand. This 
indicates that dissonance was reduced less successfully by these participants.  
Generally, since these participants refused to accept the demanded act psychologically, which 
led to rejection of the act as soon as it was not directly and explicitly ordered, the escalation of 
behavior as it is defined in this study did not take place in this group, because the resistance 
against the act did not directly decrease. This is an important factor in regard to organizational 
corruption, because, as we have seen, the internalization of corrupt practices is crucial for the 
acceptance and spreading of corruption throughout the organization and for the 
institutionalization of corruption (e.g. Ashfort and Anand, 2003). Individuals, who might 
behave obediently towards a direct and explicit demand from an authority figure, such as a 
supervisor, but who refuse to internalize it, and reject it as soon as no direct order is given, 
might hinder such a spread and maintenance of corruption in an organization.  
Finally, participants who internalized the demand expressed on average the least amount of 
protest, which further decreased directly throughout the experiment. These results indicate an 
increase of psychological acceptance of the demanded act, which is argued to result from 
rationalization processes. In order to reduce dissonance, participants who internalized the 
demand rationalized the act in a manner, which led to its justification and to a constantly 
rising psychological acceptance- and hence to constantly lower protest. This indication is 
confirmed by different patterns regarding the different modes of disbursement: In the 
beginning-phase, higher severity of the act led to lower amounts of protest. This paradoxical 
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fact can too be explained by rationalization, adapting its strengths to the magnitude of 
discrepancy between behavior and self as a function of severity of the act.  
In general, for participants who internalized the demand, rationalization and the subsequent 
higher psychological acceptance of the act can not only explain why they showed least, as 
well as decreasing, resistance against the act throughout the experiment, but also why they 
decided to internalize it in the second-phase. The decision to perform the act even when the 
authority is physically absent implies a high psychological acceptance of that act. As a 
consequence, after the experiment, participants who internalized felt less nervous, more 
satisfied and stated a more positive general affectivity than participants who didn’t internalize, 
which indicates that they experienced less dissonance. Accordingly, compared to participants 
who terminated the experiment, they also felt more bored, calmer, more placid and more 
relaxed. Hence, this group of participants cognitively and affectively evaluated their behavior 
more positively than the other groups of participants. As results show, within this group of 
participants, an escalation of behavior was empirically found. Moreover, as Table 1 
illustrates, this effect was generally stronger for male than for female participants, because the 
amount of protest decreased more strongly for male participants throughout the experiment.  
Limitations 
Generally, the threat to the self, which is created by the inconsistent act in the experiment, 
differs from the one stemming from behaving immorally, unethically and corruptly. Unlike in 
cases of corruption, participants in the present study are more likely to feel foolish, 
inconsistently and incompetently acting, rather than guilty or morally bad. Moreover, the 
participants in the experiment were not confronted with anticipated negative consequences, 
resulting from their inconsistent behavior. Nevertheless, even though situation and conflict in 
the experiment might not be fully comparable to corruption, threats to the self as well as 
violations of societal norms in general arouse dissonance (Stone and Cooper, 2001). Hence, 
the reduction of dissonance through rationalization should have comparable effects: justifying 
the dissonance arousing behavior and subsequently increasing its psychological acceptance. 
Furthermore, the first conflict in the experiment (item 4) differs to some extent from the other 
conflicts. This is because in this situation the authority demands the act for the very first time, 
and, therefore, it is impossible for participants to already perform the act without being told to 
do so, as it is the case in the following conflicts. Nevertheless, since this conflict is 
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comparable for participants who internalized and those who didn’t internalize, we included it 
in our analysis, as it states that the amount of protest at this point is still the same. 
Conclusion  
In the present study, we achieved to experimentally find a process of escalation of behavior, 
defined as an increase in severity, ease and pervasiveness of a negative act (Fleming and 
Zyglidopoulos, 2008). The results confirm the theoretical assumptions regarding an escalation 
of behavior within cases of corruption: The performance of an act, which was originally 
rendered negatively, becomes gradually easier, even though the act itself becomes gradually 
more severe. Moreover, as results indicate, the underlying psychological ‘engine’ of this 
mechanism is the arousal of dissonance through an act that is inconsistent with the own sense 
of self, and the subsequent reduction of dissonance through rationalization, which renders the 
act psychologically more and more acceptable. Thus, results state that by rationalizing and 
justifying previous acts that are inconsistent with the self-concept, people are led to engage in 
increasingly severe acts while at the same time their resistance against the act decreases.  
Furthermore, results indicate that the cause that initiated the different patterns of protest in 
this experiment was the obedient behavior towards an authority figure. The trait of 
authoritarian submission was the only personality variable, which was related to the amount 
of protest. The higher a person’s tendency to be uncritically submissive to the authority’s 
demand, the less likely it is that he or she will engage in the external conflict with the 
authority figure by openly protesting. Instead, the higher the authoritarian submission, the 
more a person tends to behave obediently and engage in the internal conflict in order to avoid 
contradiction with the authority. However, in highly structured situations, the perceived 
norms and roles seem to be more influential for behavior, while personality traits are less 
influential. This means that in the experiment, personality does not determine obedient 
behavior. Instead, there seems to be an interaction between the situational norm of behaving 
obediently towards an authority figure and the general personal tendency to behave 
submissively to such figures. 
Thus, as can be seen in the experiment, an external, authoritarian force can have a crucial 
effect on the initiation of the escalation of behavior, because it pressures the individual into 
performing an act, it otherwise would not have done, since it is- to some extent- inconsistent 
with the self- concept and thus the expectancies one holds about oneself and one’s behavior. 
This is an important aspect in regard to organizational corruption, because organizational 
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environments are often characterized by hierarchical structures between individuals and 
supervisors or veteran co-workers (Brief, Buttram & Dukerich, 2001; Ashfort and Anand, 
2003), and the individual is often confronted with external demands, stemming from these 
entities that are perceived as authorities (e.g., Nieuwenboer & Kaptein, 2007, Stieglitz, 2010, 
Baucus, 1994). Therefore, the role of obedient behavior within the escalation of corruption 
seems to be fundamental, as it can initiate inconsistent behavior and the following escalating 
consequences through its rationalization. In cases such as ENRON and WORLDCOM, the 
corrupt practices were not only tolerated, but demanded from higher hierarchical levels to 
lower ones (Brickey, 2003).  
As a consequence, regarding corruption within organizations, our results indicate that a 
structure of hierarchy that is more horizontal instead of strictly vertical could contribute to 
impede the escalation, because such a structure would enable individuals to express more 
protest against an demand that contradicts the own sense of self. Accordingly Ashfort and 
Anand (2003) noted that within the social cocoon of an organization, individuals may 
recognize corrupt practices but simply are too powerless to effectively resist and hinder it, and 
subsequently comply to the acts they condemned. Moreover, in accordance with Zimbardo 
(1974), these results demonstrate a known fundamental weakness of socialization processes in 
our society, as the tendency to behave submissively to authority figures, even when one does 
neither comprehend nor psychologically accept their demands, was a crucial factor for the 
initiation of the rationalization of the act and the subsequent escalation of behavior. As 
Cressey (1986) stated regarding corrupt managers, they “should be viewed as conformists, 
rather than criminals” (p.196).  
Finally, regarding ethical training within organizations as an instrument against corruption 
(e.g., Voliotis, 2011; Rabl, 2011), the process of escalation of behavior, as well as its 
psychological groundwork, should be integrated into such programs in order to generate a 
broader consciousness, which could impede the justification of inconsistent acts through 
rationalization. Moreover, in our opinion, certain factors within organizational and market 
environment, such as high performance pressure, extreme competition (Baucus, 1994), or 
incentives for excessive risk taking (Stieglitz, 2010), are likely to negatively interact with the 
psychological mechanism of dissonance reduction through rationalization, and therefore fuel 
an escalation of behavior, because justification of deviant behavior is to some extent already 
inherent in such factors. These notions indicate that organizational corruption cannot be 
understood as an isolated and independent behavior of single individuals or even single 
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organizations, such as Enron or WorldCom, but that, instead, it is deeply rooted in market 
norms and societal socialization processes and closely interacting with these factors. 
However, as result of the present study illustrate, the incremental escalation of negative 
behavior, which is also an important factor inherent in organizational corruption, starts at the 
individual level, and can be triggered by obedience towards an authority figure’s demand.  
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Appendix 
Instructions: 
      Versuchspersonen-Code: _______________________ 
 
Instruktion Buchhalter: 
Im folgenden Spiel wurde Ihnen die Rolle des Buchhalters zugeteilt. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, folgende Rechenaufgaben 
vorzulesen, die von der anderen Versuchsperson gelöst werden sollen. Sie darf dafür Papier und Bleistift verwenden und 
hat nur einen Antwortversuch. Im Falle einer richtigen Antwort sollen Sie den jeweils der Aufgabe zugeordneten Geldbetrag 
(siehe beiliegende Tabelle) auszahlen. Bei einer falschen Antwort erfolgt keine Auszahlung. Vermerken Sie für jede Aufgabe 
den ausgezahlten Betrag in der Spalte „Ausgezahlter Betrag“. 
     Richtige Lösung    Ausgezahlter Betrag 
Übungsaufgabe A 3 * 4 =   12     - 
Übungsaufgabe B 75 – 23 =  52     - 
      
Aufgabe 1  2⁴ =   16    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 2  500 – 122 =  378    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 3  330 – 55 =   275    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 4  189 / 9 =                    21     € _______________ 
Aufgabe 5  3⁴ =   81    € _______________ 
Aufgabe6  √49 – 23 =  -16    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 7  224 * 2/8 =  56    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 8  √100 * 0.43 =  4.3    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 9  88/11 * 400 =  3200    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 10  13 * 12 =                    156     € _______________ 
Aufgabe 11  17 * 6 =   102    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 12  64/4 * 3 =  48    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 13  110/11 * 0.25 =  2,5    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 14  221 – 38 + 7 =  190    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 15  104 – 68 + 57 =  93    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 16  121 / 11 =  11    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 17  89*2 + 24 =  202    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 18  84*2 + 43 =  211    € _______________ 
Aufgabe 19  474 – 17 =  457    € _______________ 
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Versuchspersonen-Code: _______________________ 
 
Instruktion Schüler: 
Im folgenden Spiel wurde Ihnen die Rolle des Schülers zugeteilt. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, folgende Rechenaufgaben vorzulesen, 
die von der anderen Versuchsperson gelöst werden sollen. Sie dürfen dafür Papier und Bleistift verwenden und haben nur 
einen Antwortversuch. Im Falle einer richtigen Antwort sollen Sie den jeweils der Aufgabe zugeordneten Geldbetrag 
auszahlen. Bei einer falschen Antwort erfolgt keine Auszahlung. Vermerken Sie für jede Aufgabe den ausgezahlten Betrag in 
der Spalte „Ausgezahlter Betrag“. 
     Richtige Lösung            Antwort  Erhaltener Betrag  
Übungsaufgabe A                    3 * 4 =                   12                  12   - 
Übungsaufgabe B                   75 – 23 =                   52                   52   - 
      
Aufgabe 1  2⁴ =   16  16  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 2  500 – 122 =  378  378  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 3  330 – 55 =   275  275  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 4  189 / 9 =                   21   17  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 5  3⁴ =   81    56  € _______________ 
Aufgabe6  √49 – 23 =  -16  -16  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 7  224 * 2/8 =  56   112  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 8  √100 * 0.43 =  4.3   43  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 9  88/11 * 400 =  3200  3200  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 10  13 * 12 =                   156   126  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 11  17 * 6 =   102  102  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 12  64/4 * 3 =  48  48  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 13  110/11 * 0.25 =  2,5  18,5  € _______Protest 
Aufgabe 14  221 – 38 + 7 =  190  190  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 15  104 – 68 + 57 =  93   85  € _______ Protest 
Aufgabe 16  121 / 11 =  11  11  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 17  89*2 + 24 =  202  192  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 18  84*2 + 43 =  211  k.A.  € _______________ 
Aufgabe 19  474 – 17 =  457  k.A.  € _______________ 
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Auszahlungstabelle
Aufgabennummer €
1 4 13 28
2 6 14 30
3 8 15 32
4 10 16 34
5 12 17 36
6 14 18 38
7 16 19 40
8 18
9 20
10 22
11 24
12 26
 
Auszahlungstabelle
Aufgabennummer €
1 1 13 23
2 1 14 28
3 1 15 36
4 2 16 44
5 2 17 55
6 2 18 70
7 3 19 90
8 3
9 4
10 12
11 15
12 18
 
 
VPNcode:
Lineare Belohnung
€
Aufgaben1    2    3    4 5 6    7 8 9    10 11    12   13 14    15 16   17 18 19  
Exponentielle Belohnung
Lernphase                                      Vl abwesend                „Meischberger“ 
1. „Zahlen Sie es trotzdem aus.“
2. „Es ist wichtig, dass Sie trotzdem auszahlen.“
3. Es ist für das Experiment unverzichtbar, dass sie jetzt auszahlen.“
4. Sie haben keine andere Wahl - Sie müssen auszahlen.
Auszahlungsmodus:                                   Compliance Vertrag:
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